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Abstract 
Charity giving decisions are complex and often biased by people’s cognitive and 
affective processes; they have to consider a large amount of information about the recipient, 
his/her situation, the charity organization, and this might require a lot of effort. For this 
reason, heuristics are often used to make a similar process easier. The present dissertation 
focuses on how anchors, presented as social information can influence decisions related to 
charity giving. On the one side, individuals can simply anchor to numbers they read on a 
sheet of paper (which represent the average amount of money that others’ donate) as a result 
of the intuitive thinking. On the other hand, they have to think about the appropriateness of 
their decision, the objective need of the victim, and other dimensions of the charitable cause, 
which are difficult to appraise. Therefore, donors are likely to follow the reference made by 
an anchor referring to other people’s behavior and, thanks to the anchoring and adjustment 
heuristic, there is room to increase donations. The dissertation tested this hypothesis and also 
explored some of the boundaries of the effect of anchoring and social influence on donation 
decisions. 
In three experiments I explored participants’ choices when different anchors are used 
(or not). In Experiment 1, two groups of participants were informed about low versus high 
average donations of other people, and a third control group did not receive any information 
about others’ behavior. The results showed that participants were willing to donate 
significantly more in the high-anchor condition compared to the low-anchor condition, as 
well as about the same amount of money in the low-anchor condition and no-anchor 
condition. Experiment 2 and 3 showed that high anchors are more effective when the 
information about others’ donations informs about the behavior of members of an ingroup 
rather than an outgroup. However, the group belongingness of the charity target did not have 
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a significant effect on the results. The theoretical relevance of the results is discussed in 
relation to the past work on prosocial behavior. Furthermore, the practical implications for 
the humanitarian aid organizations and fund raising campaigns are discussed.  
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Riassunto 
Le decisioni che riguardano le donazioni in beneficenza sono complesse e spesso 
influenzate dai processi cognitivi ed emotivi delle persone. Infatti, tenere in considerazione 
l’ingente quantità di informazioni riguardanti il ricevente, la sua situazione, l’organizzazione 
caritevole, può richiedere uno sforzo notevole. Per rendere tale processo più semplice spesso 
vengono usate le euristiche. Questa tesi di dottorato si focalizza sul modo in cui l’utilizzo di 
ancore, presentate come informazione sociale, possono influenzare le decisioni riguardo alle 
donazioni in beneficenza. Da un lato, le persone possono intuitivamente utilizzare come 
ancora i numeri che leggono su un foglio di carta (che rappresenta quanto le altre persone 
donano in media). Dall’altro lato,  gli individui devono pensare all’appropriatezza della loro 
decisione, al bisogno oggettivo della vittima, e ad altre dimensioni relative alla causa 
caritevole che sono più difficili da valutare. Per questo motivo, i donatori tendono ad 
utilizzare come riferimento l’ancora costituita dal comportamento delle altre persone e, grazie 
alla euristica dell’ancoraggio e d’aggiustamento, è possibile che le donazioni vengano 
incrementate. In questo progetto di ricerca ho testato questa ipotesi, esplorando anche alcuni 
limiti dell'effetto di ancoraggio e di influenza sociale sulle decisioni di donazione. 
In tre esperimenti ho esplorato come cambiavano le scelte dei partecipanti al variare 
delle ancore presentate. Nell’Esperimento 1, due gruppi di partecipanti venivano informati 
riguardo alle donazioni medie di altre persone (basse versus alte), mentre un terzo gruppo non 
riceveva nessuna informazione riguardo al comportamento degli altri. I risultati hanno 
mostrato che i partecipanti erano più propensi a donare nella condizione in cui era presentata 
un’ancora alta rispetto alla condizione di ancora bassa. Gli Esperimenti 2 e 3 hanno mostrato 
che le ancore alte sono più efficaci quando l’informazione relativa alla donazione riguarda 
membri del proprio gruppo versus membri dell’outgroup. In ogni caso, il gruppo 
d’appartenenza del target di beneficenza non ha mostrato un effetto significativo sui risultati. 
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La rilevanza teorica dei risultati viene discussa in relazione a ricerche precedenti sul 
comportamento prosociale. Inoltre, vengono discusse le implicazioni pratiche per le 
organizzazioni di aiuto umanitario e le campagne di raccolta fondi. 
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1. DECISION MAKING AND PROSOCIAL BEHAVIOR 
Many questions related to charity giving behavior have been addressed by the scientific 
community over the past years: do people choose the right person or the right program to 
help? Are they influenced by irrelevant topics while making this type of decisions? Do they 
ponder all the alternatives in a precise way or do they just base their choices on intuition?  
Surely, when giving help, people want to make the best choice, because they are always 
providing a resource (in terms of money, time, or social/affective involvement) that they give 
away, and feeling that it can make a difference can be an important motivation to their charity 
action. Since resources are not unlimited, people try to manage them in the best possible way. 
The literature review will show that this is not easy to achieve, and particularly, I will 
describe some key issues which better illustrate certain limits of human cognition. 
 1.1 Bounded rationality and decision making 
In 1738, Daniel Bernoulli showed through the St. Petersburg paradox that, differently 
from what our intuition suggests, people are not willing to take an action which would 
provide an infinite expected payoff. Later on, von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944) 
suggested that a rational agent has a utility function defined by possible outcomes for each 
option, and preferences are characterized by maximizing the expected value. In 1955, Simon 
introduced the notion of bounded rationality, explaining that people try to achieve 
satisfactory solutions rather than optimal ones, mainly because they have a limited amount of 
information, cognitive resources, and (often) time to make decisions. Simon (1986) explained 
that classical and neoclassical economy is focused on substantive rationality, instead, 
cognitive psychology is focused on procedural rationality. The first one describes rationality 
as a maximization of the subjective expected value. Individuals must have a consistent 
ordering of preferences over all possible alternatives and they choose the alternative whose 
expected utility is the greatest. In this case, people are not interested in the process, but only 
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in the final result. Alternatively, procedural rationality describes how individuals choose the 
most satisfactory alternative, using an incomplete information, and having limited 
computational abilities. In this last situation, individuals are rational if they reach the goal 
with some reasonable efficiency.  
In 1979, Tversky and Kahneman extended the research on the utility function making a 
distinction between alternatives that involve risk or not. In prospect theory, these authors 
explained that people set a reference point and then consider outcomes falling below it as 
losses and outcomes falling above the reference point as gains, and losses have a bigger 
weight than gains. Furthermore, the decision making process goes through two main stages: 
editing and evaluating. The first one is subject to framing effects (presenting the options as a 
gain or a loss), and in the second one people calculate each option utility based on the 
subjective potential outcomes and their respective probability.  
During the editing stage people rely on a number of heuristic principles which reduce 
the complex tasks of assessing probabilities predicting values to simpler judgmental 
operations. Heuristics are considered cognitive strategies which are very useful most of the 
time because they help people to make fast and fairly accurate decisions saving time and 
effort. However, they sometimes lead people to rely on irrelevant information and to make 
systematically unreasonable mistakes (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974; Gigerenzer, Todd, & the 
ABC Group, 1999; Gilovich, Griffin, & Kahneman, 2002). Heuristic reasoning is based on 
previous experiences and most of the time people rely unconsciously on intuitions, emotions, 
and contextual information rather than processing information in a more deliberative fashion 
when making decisions (Chaiken & Trope, 1999; Kahneman, 2003; Slovic, Finucane, Peters, 
& MacGregor, 2002).  
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1.1.1 Representativeness heuristic  
Representativeness heuristic describes how the probability of representative exemplars 
is judged higher because they are more representative of their category (Tversky & 
Kahneman, 1974). People do not accurately predict the likelihood of an event because they 
look for similarities between a new event and a standard one, and ignore the general rules of 
probability. In a classical experiment Tversky and Kahneman (1974) described to participants 
a person named Linda as following: “Linda is 31 years old, single, outspoken, and very 
bright. She majored in philosophy. As a student, she was deeply concerned with issues of 
discrimination and social justice, and also participated in anti-nuclear demonstrations”. 
Subsequently, they asked them to choose between two options: 1) Linda is a bank teller or 2) 
Linda is a bank teller and is active in the feminist movement. Objectively, the probability of 
two events happening together (conjunction probability) is always less than or equal to the 
probability of either one occurring alone, but 90% of the participants chose the second option, 
because that is more representative for the category. 
1.1.2 Availability heuristic   
Availability heuristic states that an event is considered more likely because it is more 
familiar or available to people’s minds. According to this heuristic, the easier it is to recall the 
consequences of something, the greater we perceive its consequences. For example, if you 
ask someone which is the disease that provokes more deaths between cancer and heart 
diseases, there are high probabilities that he/she responds cancer, because it receives a higher 
coverage in the media, and it is characterized by more traumatic symptoms. In other words, 
cancer is the more vivid death cause of the two, so it remains more available to peoples’ 
mind. In reality, according to the World Health Organization (WHO, 2013) heart diseases 
remained the first cause of death during 2000 and 2011. Specifically, there were 7 million 
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people who died from ischemic heart disease during this time frame and 1.5 million people 
who died from lung, trachea, and bronchus cancer.  
1.1.3 Anchoring and adjustment heuristic  
A third heuristic, which is particularly important for the present dissertation, is the 
anchoring heuristic (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974). It describes how people can rely on 
irrelevant information and use it as an anchor while making judgments. When using the 
anchoring and adjustment heuristics, people rely more than necessary on arbitrary values, 
called anchors, even when they are clearly irrelevant to the question they have been asked to 
answer.  
For example, in one of their experiments, Tversky & Kahneman (1974) asked 
participants to estimate the percentage of African countries represented at the United Nations. 
Before providing an estimate, participants were asked to spin a “wheel of fortune,” which 
would return a value between 10 and 65. The number, extracted by chance from the wheel, 
was not relevant to the question participants were asked; however, their responses were still 
influenced by it. Those who were presented with the low value versus the high value as 
starting numbers estimated respectively a median of 25 and 45 percent of African countries 
represented at the United Nations, therefore showing to be influenced by the irrelevant 
numbers extracted by the “wheel of fortune” which should have been ignored. In studies like 
those conducted by Kahneman and Tversky, anchors were provided by the experimenters; 
however Epley and Gilovich (2006) reported that, when no starting value is present, people 
can self-generate an anchor in order to have a cue from which to start reasoning. For instance, 
Epley & Gilovich (2004) asked participants to respond to a series of 12 questions for which 
they did not know the correct answers but for which they could easily generate their own 
anchors. For example, most American citizens do not know when George Washington was 
elected president, but they do know that the Declaration of Independence was in 1776 and 
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that it is close to the date of George Washington’s election. Therefore, they can 
hypothetically start from this date and then adjust it in the direction of the correct answer. 
Self-generated anchors are more prone to adjustment, because the subject knows that 
the number that popped up in his/her mind is likely to be wrong and is simply a starting point 
he/she is using to reach the correct answer. Instead, when people have no previous knowledge 
about a certain topic and others provide an anchor for them, they start from the hypothesis 
that the anchor is a hint to the correct answer, assuming that the speaker should only provide 
relevant information (Epley & Gilovich, 2006). 
More generally, the most accepted explanation for the anchoring bias is that the 
adjustment is often insufficient and requires effort (Ariely, Loewenstein, & Prelec, 2003; 
Sunstein, Kahneman, Schkade, & Ritov, 2003; Tversky & Kahneman, 1974). Recent studies 
have shown that this bias works because people search for information which is consistent 
with the anchor (Mussweiler, Strack, & Pfeiffer, 2000), and they stop adjusting once they 
think they have reached a plausible value (Epley & Gilovich, 2006). Often, people rely on 
anchors while they are interpreting ambiguous or conflicting social contexts, or when they 
have information about what other individuals do in a particular situation. This is typically 
likely to happen when a situation involves moral evaluations (e.g., sexuality, human cloning, 
tax evasion, charitable giving). Sunstein (2005) explained that, in these circumstances, people 
anchor to some authority’s opinion; for example, Christian religion has shaped public 
attitudes toward abortion for two thousand years, or euthanasia was initially influenced by the 
philosophers (Socrates, Plato, Hippocrates), later on by Judeo-Christian tradition,  and  
additionally by doctors.  
1.2 Theories of prosocial behavior 
A first definition of prosocial behavior defines it as “voluntary actions which aim to 
give help to another individual or group of individuals” (Eisenberg & Mussen, 1989). Instead, 
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a second definition refers to prosocial behavior as an altruistic behavior and underlines that it 
is present when those who give help do not expect to receive a benefit  in the moment they 
decide to help the other person (empathy-altruism hypothesis; Batson, Batson, Singlsby, 
Harrell, Peekna, & Todd, 1991). For example, in the “dictator game”, often individuals 
choose to give money to another person even though it results in their disadvantage. The way 
people make decisions related to charity giving is related to the reason why people decide to 
help. Below there will be described three major perspectives that aim to explain prosocial 
behavior. 
1.2.1 The evolutionary hypothesis 
The evolutionary hypothesis supports the idea that human beings are genetically 
programed to give help. In 1859 Darwin stated that because of natural selection organisms 
often act in line with their self-interests. Organisms that survive and successfully reproduce 
pass on their traits over time; traits that are the most adaptive become more representative 
within a population, whereas those that are the least adaptive eventually disappear. 
Subsequently, Hamilton (1964) recognized that an individual’s total fitness depends on 
his/her own reproductive output plus the total reproductive output of all kin who share some 
of the individual’s genes, and that explains why people manifest a predisposition to help 
those who share a higher number of genes with them (kin selection). In other words, the main 
goal is not to satisfy an egoistic or individualistic necessity, but to maximize transmission of 
genes to the next generation. Burnstein, Crandall, & Kitayama (1994) hypothesized that we 
do not only help those who are genetically more similar to us, but also, we choose to help 
those individuals who are healthier, to make sure that they have high possibilities to 
reproduce. Furthermore, Trivers (1971) suggested that people derive benefits under an 
evolutionary perspective to help strangers if the favor is returned in a second moment.  
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In 1998, Sober and Wilson introduced a model of group selection: there are instances in 
which specific groups of people, rather than individuals, are the primary units of selection. In 
this case, the members of “successful” groups are more reproductively successful than 
members of less prosperous groups. According to the authors, the probability that group 
selection evolved depends, in certain cases, on three parameters: a) the amount of personal 
costs associated with making sacrifices for the group, b) the amount of personal benefits 
associated with doing so, and c) the proportion of altruistic versus non-altruistic members 
within the group.  
Other authors think that reciprocal altruism is a genetic expression and this could be 
verified from the presence of a universal reciprocity norm in all the cultures, which is, 
everyone is entitled to a fair treatment and the responsibility to ensure justice to others 
(Bornstein, 2002; Gouldner, 1960). Later on, Richerson and Boyd (2005) proposed that group 
selection occurs through the joint operation of genetic and cultural evolution. In other words, 
cultural variants (i.e., cultural knowledge, skills, and ideas) that enhance survival and 
reproduction are more likely to continue within a culture due to selection-like processes. 
However, cultural variants are also vulnerable to biased transmission in which certain 
variants become more successful because of their content (easier to remember, therefore 
more likely to use), their frequency (commonness within a population), and the people who 
model them (group leaders vs. followers).   
1.2.2 Empathy-altruism model  
As introduced before, this model upholds the idea that there is pure altruism only when 
the helper does not expect a reward while giving help to someone else. In this case, the main 
explanation of why people decide to help is affective and based, in particular, on empathic 
reactions (Eisenberg & Miller, 1987). Empathy is defined as the “emotional reaction of an 
individual induced from the emotional expression of another individual” (Shelton e Rogers, 
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1981). Batson and colleagues (Batson et al, 1989; Batson, Bolen, Cross, Neuringer-Benefiel, 
1986; Batson, Duncan, Ackerman, Bucldey, & Birch, 1981; Batson et al., 1991) conducted 
several studies in which they found support for the "empathy-altruism" theory. Based on this 
theory, individuals tend to establish a sharing relationship with the other that allows them to 
feel what he/she feels, and motivates them to reduce his/her discomfort. The authors 
explained that if the others’ sufferance induces an “egoistic displeasure”, we would mainly be 
motivated to reduce our stress, and if possible, avoid the stressful situation. Instead, if the 
goal is the reduction of the others’ sufferance, the possibility to avoid a stressful situation 
would not influence the choice to give help to the one who needs it. In order to test this 
hypothesis Batson and collaborators (Batson et al., 1981) ran a study where participants had 
to observe a girl named Elaine (confederate of the experimenter) while she was receiving an 
electric shock. After a while Elaine left the experimental room, went to the next one where 
there was the observer, and started to tell her painful experience adding that, anyway, she was 
willing to continue. Immediately after, the experimenter came in and proposed to the 
observer to take Elaine’s place if he/she wanted to help. At this point, Batson and colleagues 
introduced their experimental manipulation: whether participants had the possibility to escape 
or not. Half of participants were informed that the experiment was almost finished (easy 
escape condition), instead to the other half it was said that there was still some time before 
the end of the test (difficult escape condition). 
Results showed that when the empathy level was low, the help given to Elaine was low 
as well, independently from the possibility to escape or not. Instead, when the empathy level 
was high, the help offered by participants was high, even when it was easy to escape and 
avoid the stressful situation.  
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1.2.3 Egoistic-altruism theories  
This third perspective supports the idea that helping behavior has the final goal of 
providing a personal advantage. Thibaut and Kelley (1959) suggested that individuals help 
for personal interest. If a certain behavior did produce advantages in the past, and the 
circumstances are repeated again, it is much more likely that people repeat the same behavior 
in the future. Some type of advantages that people might receive while giving help are the 
possibility to be helped in the future, social approval, higher self-esteem, and feeling relieved 
about a good action.  
Negative state relief model. Within this theoretical approach, Cialdini and colleagues 
(Cialdini, Schaller, Houlihan, Arps, Fultz, & Beaman, 1987) proposed that a helping behavior 
is more likely to happen when the person is in a bad mood, and doing something good to 
others makes him/her feel better. This theory underlines the fact that people should know if 
their help was effective for others. Smith, Keating, and Scotland (1989) corrected this 
hypothesis saying that giving help to others does not have as a unique goal the personal relief 
from a negative mood, but simply experience the feelings of joy when they observe that 
others are feeling better (empathic-joy theory).  
Warm-Glow theory. This theory reveals different egoistic motives that explain why 
people help others (Andreoni 1990; Andreoni, 1995). In a series of experiments, Andreoni 
(1990) showed that individuals are mostly influenced by social pressure, the desire to earn 
prestige, friendship or respect, so, they would help much more in the presence of others rather 
than when they are alone. Warm glow, in this context, is defined as an increase in utility 
resulting from the act of giving in addition to utility generated by the increase of the total 
supply of the public good. Utility depends on private consumption, total public goods, and 
own public contribution. In one of his experiments Andreoni (1995) gave participants the 
possibility to manage some money and use them to contribute either in private or public 
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goods. He created two groups with identical incentives, but different frames. In a positive 
frame participants were told that their own private consumption would have not affected 
others, but public contributions would have produced a positive outcome for others. Instead, 
in the negative frame condition participants were told that private consumption would have 
deprived others from public consumption, but public contribution would have not affected 
others. The final outcome for private and public goods between the two frames was similar, 
but subjects in the positive frame contributed about twice as much to public consumption as 
did those in negative frame. This results proved that people do not only care for the others’ 
final outcome, but also for the act of doing good, and on the contrary to the pure altruism 
theory, warm-glow theory explains that doing a good deed (warm-glow) provides a higher 
utility than not doing a bad deed (cold-prickle). 
1.2.4 Two-stage model of donation decision  
Dickert, Sagara e Slovic (2011) integrated the models described above, that is, the pure 
altruism theory and egoistic altruism theory, suggesting that decisions related to charity 
giving are developed in two stages: in the first stage donors decide if they want to donate or 
not, whereas, in the second one, they decide how much to donate. The main differences 
between these two stages are based on the specific cognitive and motivational processes 
underneath them. The decision to donate or not seems to be determined by more egoistic 
feelings, like personal mood, because the degree to which a donation would make the donor 
feel better was predictive of the donation decision in Stage 1. Instead, in the second stage 
people decide how much to donate, based on their empathic feelings. Thus, the decision to 
donate or not is primarily determined by affective responses that are focused on the self (e.g., 
how much better a person feels after helping someone else) and the amount donated is 
primarily determined by emotions that are focused on others (e.g., sympathy and 
compassion).  
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1.3 The importance of affect 
Previous literature on charity giving reports affect as one of the key factors which 
motivates people to engage in a helping behavior. Most of the works have found that higher 
affective reactions result in higher helping behavior as well (Batson et al., 1991; Kogut & 
Ritov, 2005a, b; Slovic, 2007). Batson and colleagues (Batson et al., 1981; Batson et al., 
1986; Batson et al, 1989; Batson et al., 1991) concluded over several experiments that higher 
empathy toward the victim motivates people give more help. Participants in Kogut and Ritov 
studies (2005a, 2005b) reported higher feelings of distress and empathic concern for a single 
identified victim rather than an identified group of victims, which also explained higher 
donations toward the first ones. Slovic (2007) writes that just like in the psychophysical 
principle described by Fechner and Weber law (Weber, 1834; Fechner, 1860) people show a 
marginal decreasing sensitivity which might explain their inability to appreciate losses of life 
as they become larger. Furthermore, limitations in the ability to experience compassion might 
even provoke a collapse in the willingness to help when the number of victims increases. 
Other authors have reported that self-focused feelings like anticipated regret (Miller & 
Taylor, 2002), warm-glow feelings (Andreoni, 1990), or general positive feelings related to 
the act of giving rather than the victims’ well-being are also important motivators of helping 
behavior (Thibaut & Kelley, 1959; Cialdini et al, 1987; Smith et al.,1989).  
Affect is a quick, easy, and efficient indicator that people can use to operate in a 
complex world, that is why people often rely on it when making decisions (Slovic et al., 
2002). Without affect information may lack meaning, and people would have difficulties to 
manage their everyday life (Loewenstein, Weber, Hsee, & Welch, 2001; Slovic et al., 2002). 
Affect is mainly processed in an unconscious way through the intuitive thinking process, 
which is also labeled as System 1 or experiential system (Epstein, 1994; Kahneman, 2003; 
Kahneman & Frederick, 2002; Petty & Cacioppo, 1986; Sloman, 1996; Stanovich & West, 
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2000). People’s memory constantly searches for information and the affective value of the 
associations arising from these searches are used to categorize stimuli as either pleasant or 
unpleasant. As suggested by Epstein (1994), if the activated feelings are pleasant, they 
motivate actions and thoughts expected to reproduce these feelings. However, if the activated 
feelings are unpleasant, they are more likely to motivate actions and thoughts expected to 
avoid these feelings. 
There are two different types of feelings related to a victim that influence prosocial 
behavior: self-focused affect and other-focused affect (Andreoni, 1990; Batson et al., 1991; 
Cialdini et al., 1987; Dickert et al., 2011). The first one motivates helping behavior as a way 
to reduce an unpleasant emotional state, whereas the second one motivates helping behavior 
through the concern about the victim. Importantly, these two different types of feelings are 
often both involved in the decision to give and seem to influence prosocial behavior at 
different stages of the decision process (Dickert et al., 2011). Self-focused affect is easier to 
access and less effortful than other-focused affect (Batson et al., 1991; Hodges & Wegner, 
1997; Sabbagh & Taylor, 2000). Instead, other-focused affect depends on people's 
perspective taking and cognitive appraisal (Batson et al., 1991; Dickert et al., 2011; Lamm, 
Batson, & Decety, 2007).  
Affect can also direct peoples’ attention toward specific stimuli: accordingly, highly 
relevant stimuli seem to be processed faster and hold attention longer (Fox, 2002; Eastwood, 
Smilek, & Merikle, 2001; Loewenstein et al., 2001). However, the influence of emotions on 
attention is not always correlated with the importance of a stimulus. In fact, it has been 
reported than affective reactions are strongly related to imagery, or differently, to peoples’ 
ability to create a concrete mental representation of objects and events (Damasio, 2004; 
MacGregor, Slovic, Dreman, & Berry, 2000; Slovic et al., 2002). As a consequence, priority 
is given to vivid stimuli rather than actually important but not vivid ones. This explains why 
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people tend to report higher affective reactions toward a single identified victim compared to 
identified groups of victims (Dickert & Slovic, 2009; Slovic, 2007). 
The relationship between affect and attention is bidirectional: not only affect can orient 
attention, but attention can also influence affective reactions (Fenske & Raymond, 2006). For 
example, Cameron and Payne (2011) have shown that when participants expect the need for 
help to be overwhelming they engage in emotion regulation to prevent themselves from 
experiencing higher levels of negative emotion. Another study has found that sympathy 
ratings were lower and reaction times were higher when targets were presented with a 
distractor in a computer task (Dickert & Slovic, 2009). Additional analysis revealed that 
affective responses were higher when sympathy judgments about the target were made online 
(on the moment of the target presentation) than when they were made from offline (from 
memory).   
1.3.1 Affect heuristic and charity giving  
Because of the characteristics of affect mentioned above, people make many decisions 
every day based on it (Epstein, 1994; Finucane, Alhakami, Slovic, & Johnson, 2000; 
Kahneman, 2003; Slovic et al., 2002). Zajonc (1980) said that affective reactions to stimuli 
are often the very first reactions, occurring automatically and subsequently, guiding 
information processing and judgment, and later on Damasio (1994) added that affective 
feelings and emotions are associated with anticipated consequences of people’s actions 
(somatic marker hypothesis). 
In charitable giving, affect is often used to make decisions about helping others, but not 
always this results in a positive outcome. Small, Loewenstein, and Slovic (2007) asked 
participants to make a contribution in three different conditions: 1) a single identified victim 
2) statistics related to lives at risk 3) or a single victim accompanied by the statistical 
information. The results showed that in the third experimental condition, statistical 
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information decreased the willingness to donate for the single victim. Furthermore, in a 
subsequent study, Small and colleagues (2007) made the participants undergo either an 
affective or analytical task before reading the scenario in order to activate respectively their 
System 1 or System 2. This time, the authors found that the affective task did not produce an 
increase in favor of the “statistical victims” but the analytical task reduced donations for the 
single victim. In sum, both these studies demonstrate how difficult it is to increase empathy 
and help toward a group of victims and how easy it is to decrease them.  
Other studies have found the implications of affect in the amount of help given to 
identified and unidentified victims (Kogut & Ritov, 2005a, Small & Loewenstein, 2005), but 
Slovic (2007) stated that identifiability may not be the only explanation for people’s affect 
deficiency. Slovic and colleagues presented a group of participants the picture of a single 
victim named Rokia, a second group with the picture of another victim named Moussa, and a 
third group with both victims (Rokia and Moussa). Results indicated that already in the 
presence of two victims, even though  they were identified with a picture and a short story, 
participants showed a diminished sensibility toward the victims and donated significantly less 
in the third condition compared to the other two conditions. This, according to the authors, 
indicates a possible collapse of compassion much earlier than expected, only for a number of 
two victims.  
1.4 Other heuristics in charity giving 
Although it looks easy to decide who we want to donate, how are we going to do this 
and so on, people might run into certain difficulties to accomplish their goals. This often 
happens because there are many other heuristics which we make use while deciding about 
this topic which make people lose some important information or focus too much into 
irrelevant information related to the charity issue. Below, there will be described some of the 
main heuristics identified in charity giving literature.  
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1.4.1 Evaluability heuristic  
According to Hsee (1996) when comparing two objects that have more than one 
attribute in which one is hard to evaluate independently (as a single attribute) and the other 
one is easy to evaluate independently there might be a preference reversal between joint and 
separate evaluation. For example, imagine two different charity organizations that want to 
help the same number of children in Africa, one is asking €10 and 5% of this money goes to 
managerial costs instead the other one is asking €15 and only 2% of the money goes to 
managerial costs. If you compare these choices independently and you have no idea about the 
managerial costs of a charity organization (difficult to evaluate attribute) you might choose 
the first option because it helps the same number of children for a smaller amount of money 
and you probably cannot estimate if the managerial costs are too high or too low. Differently, 
if you compare these options together, you will be more able to compare the managerial costs 
between the two organizations, and probably choose the second option because it makes a 
better use of your money.  
Similarly, the unit-asking method proposed by Hsee, Zhang, Lu, and Xu (2013) 
confirmed the influence that evaluability can have in the field of donation decisions. These 
authors found that it was possible to increase people’s donations to a group if they were first 
asked how much they were willing to donate for one needy child. In this way, it was possible 
to make them scope sensitive and induce them to donate more to the group compared to a 
situation in which they were not asked to report the donation amount for the single child 
before. These results can be explained on the basis of people’s internal desire for consistency, 
which leads to increase the donation to a group compared to the reference point established 
by the donation to the single child (Ariely et al., 2003; Freedman & Fraser 1966). The unit-
asking method is different from the identifiability victim effect, because the authors used an 
image in both conditions, therefore the identifiability of the children was already high. Also, 
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this effect is different from the foot-in-the-door effect (Freedman & Fraser, 1966), because it 
concerns attitudinal consistency; people keep donating money to the needy individuals 
because they have publicly expressed their interest in doing that. Instead, the unit-asking 
effect is more related to analytical consistency. This does not guarantee that they would 
donate 20 times more if they are presented with 20 children in need after stating how much 
they would donate to a single child. However, people seem to become more scope sensitive 
and donate more when the unit-asking method is used.  
1.4.2 Bias against forced charity  
Often people tend to oppose to government aid programs supported by taxes because 
they consider it as “forced charity”. However, Baron (1997) argued that sometimes programs 
organized at a political level can be more efficient than direct contributions to the 
beneficiaries. From an economic point of view, the expected utility of a charity program is 
computed as the size of the possible benefits times the probability of obtaining those benefits. 
Depending on the helping programs, sometimes the personal contributions can be more 
efficient than political actions and other times it can be the opposite. In the case of personal 
contributions there are costs which people tend not to take in consideration, like finding the 
right charity cause, reaching the recipient and so on. Baron and Szymanska (2009) said that 
this bias might arise from a belief in freedom, which means that people would like to make 
themselves the decisions about helping others. For this reason they consider governmental 
programs as imperfect substitutes of their personal contributions, and believe that they would 
be better at making the right charity choices.  
 1.4.3 Diversification heuristic  
In investment, allocating money in different companies reduces risk, and sometimes 
people tend to think about donations like investments. Not only, but people also attach more 
utility or positive affect when giving to different institutions rather than one (warm-glow 
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theory; Andreoni, 1990). If they donate to only one institution, they experience just once the 
positive effect of their good deeds, regardless from giving a big or a small amount. 
Furthermore, people often confound allocation wit+h maximization. In a study made by Ubel, 
DeKay, Baron, and Asch (1996) participants were told that “kidney transplants are more 
likely to succeed if they are transplanted into patients who ‘match’ the kidney donor, and that 
the number of successful transplants one year after transplant is 8/10 for patients with a 
complete match and 7/10 for patients with a partial match”. The subjects were asked to 
allocate 100 available kidneys among two groups: 100 patients with a complete match (80% 
success rate) and 100 patients with a partial match (70% success rate). Most subjects 
allocated 50 kidneys to each group. Furthermore, when they were asked how they should 
allocate the kidneys to maximize their distribution, only 20% of the subjects gave the correct 
response, and even these participants showed a tendency to allocate the kidneys equally 
between the partial match and complete match groups.  
1.4.4 Proportion dominance heuristic  
Another confusing factor to the charity giving decisions might be related to the 
proportions of the victims saved compared to the absolute numbers of lives at risk. Slovic, 
Fischhoff, & Lichtenstein (1980) asked a group of participants to think about an illness that 
kills 100 people out of 100, and to another group to think about an illness that kills 100 
people from a town, and found that they were more willing to help when the information was 
presented as 100/100 than 100/town. Additionally, Fetherstonhaugh and colleagues 
(Fetherstonhaugh, Slovic, Johnson, & Friedrich, 1997) asked participants if they were more 
willing to help 9,000 lives from 15,000 lives at risk compared to helping 100,000 lives from 
290,000 lives at risk. From the prospect theory, the subjective value associated with saving a 
certain numbers of lives is bigger for a smaller tragedy compared to a big one (Kahneman & 
Tversky, 1979) and people are more worried when the reference group becomes smaller, 
 
 
18 
 
because this consist in a bigger relative loss. In the case of a single individual, the victim 
becomes the reference of a group composed only by him/herself, and this could make the loss 
more painful and therefore more important to avoid (Jenni & Loewenstein, 1997).  
Furthermore, saving a small numbers of victims that belong to a wider population 
makes the proportion of saved lives look smaller and induce people to experience the “drop 
in the bucket” effect. This type of reasoning inhibits the helping behavior and induces people 
to think that their contribute is not sufficient compared to the severity of the humanitarian 
crisis, making their actions look useless (Small et al., 2007).  
1.4.5 Certainty effect  
According to prospect theory (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979) people give more weight to 
the reduction of probabilities when an outcome previously certain becomes uncertain than 
when an already uncertain prospect becomes even less likely. Thus 100% - 10% = 90% has 
more psychological impact than 90% - 10% = 80%, and the same is true in the opposite 
direction: going from 0% to 10% has a bigger impact than going from 10% to 20%. In the 
charitable giving context, it has been proposed that when people are presented with an 
identified victim it is possible to know for sure if there is an intervention to help the victim, 
instead, when information about statistical victims is presented, by definition, it can only be 
probabilistic. This might be an alternative explanation to why people are more sensitive to an 
identified victim rather than to the statistic information used to report the overall need.   
1.5 Emotion regulation and charity giving 
A few recent studies have shown that the lack of feelings toward a group of victims is 
not always a result of the use of the heuristics described above. Cameron and Payne (2011) 
reported that the insensitivity toward a group of victims might not depend from the collapse 
of compassion, but from strategies of emotion regulation aimed at preventing the possibility 
to experience excessive levels of negative emotions, like the pain induced from the sufferance 
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of many people. Emotion regulation is defined as a set of processes by which the individual 
modulates the emotions he/she feels, when he/she feels them, how he/she feels them, and 
how he/she expresses these emotions (Gross, 1998). Shaw, Batson & Todd (1994) have found 
that when the help is perceived as materially expensive, people actively avoid to feel 
emotions that can induce them to act. Furthermore, when people experience a high 
psychological cost (for instance, very intense feelings of compassion or concern), the 
situation becomes difficult to manage, and as a consequence, emotion regulation strategies 
become an important resource to manage an overwhelming feeling of sadness or 
powerlessness.  
The choice of emotion regulation strategy can influence in different ways how people 
face and solve the conflict between the moral principle to help a person in need and the 
economic costs they may have to face. To test such an hypothesis, Rubaltelli and Agnoli 
(2012) ran a series of experiments. In the first experiment participants were presented with 
two or three charity giving programs (depending on the experimental condition). In the first 
condition a first program asked for a donation of €150 to an African women affected by 
HIV/AIDS, instead a second program asked for a donation of €450 to three African women 
affected by the same disease. In the second experimental condition participants were 
presented with three alternative programs, the two already described above and an additional 
one which was a decoy option and asked for €500 to help two African women. Results 
showed that in the condition with two alternatives the majority of participants chose the 
program with the lower cost (64%), whereas, in the condition with three alternatives, the 
majority of participants chose the program which helped a higher number of women (67%). 
In a second study the authors replicated the same results and, in addition, measured 
participants’ emotion regulation strategies suppression and reappraisal (Gross, 1998). Results 
showed that in the condition with two alternatives, participants who showed a tendency to use 
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reappraisal were more likely chose to help three women, whereas those who showed a 
tendency to use suppression decided to help only one woman. In the condition with three 
alternatives, emotion regulation strategies did not predict the choice of the helping program. 
Once the decoy was provided, participants had an external justification to accept the higher 
cost and the majority of them choose the program that helped three women.  
1.6 Summary 
In this first chapter I introduced some basic notions related to judgment and decision 
making, from the St. Petersburg paradox (Bernoulli, 1738) to prospect theory (Kahneman & 
Tversky, 1979). Then I described three main heuristics (representativeness, availability, and 
anchoring and adjustment), with a particular focus on the anchoring and adjustment heuristic, 
which will be further discussed in the present work.  
In order to better understand charity giving behavior is important to first comprehend 
why people help others. For this reason this chapter discussed the three main theoretical 
perspectives developed to explain altruistic behavior: the evolutionary hypothesis (Bornstein, 
2002; Burnstein et al., 1994; Gouldner, 1960; Hamilton, 1964;  Trivers, 1971), the pure 
altruism hypothesis (Batson et al., 1981; 1986; 1991), and the egoistic-altruism hypothesis 
(Andreoni 1990, 1995; Cialdini et al., 1987, Smith et al., 1989; Thibaut & Kelley, 1959). The 
first one focuses on biological factors as the main reasons motivating people to behave 
altruistically, the second model focus on empathy-based feelings, whereas the last one 
emphasizes the egoistic motives like feeling better, increasing one’s self-esteem, prestige, or 
receiving a benefit at a following time.  
Most of these theories highlight the importance of affect in charity giving and prosocial 
behavior in general (Andreoni, 1990; Batson et al., 1981, 1986, 1989, 1991; Cialdini et al., 
1987; Thibaut & Kelley, 1959). Slovic (2007) argues that the capacity to experience affect 
reflects one of the fundamental mechanisms which can provide serious deficiencies in our 
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humanity, and most of the time this is a results of the heuristics we use while making charity 
giving decisions. Furthermore, the literature reveals that it is not always affect that guides our 
thoughts and choices toward a charity cause, but sometimes it can be the opposite: when 
people realize that the help needed  is overwhelming they regulate their emotions based on 
the charity request (Cameron & Payne, 2011). Also, depending on the emotion regulation 
strategy (suppression vs. reappraisal) they respond differently to the same charity scenario 
(Rubaltelli & Agnoli, 2012).  
Both anchoring heuristic and affect are important to this dissertation because 
participants in the present studies will be presented with a social information to which they 
could anchor, with a potential impact on their affective reactions as well. The next few 
chapters aim to explore the factors that will be manipulated in the studies described later on. 
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2. SOCIAL INFLUENCE 
People often compare themselves with others in order to reduce uncertainty (Festinger, 
1954). Many times, they accept others’ responses because they do not have all the required 
information, but on other occasions people simply conform to others’ thoughts, attitudes, or 
behavior in order to be accepted and liked by them (Deutsch & Gerard, 1955; Epley & 
Gilovich, 2006; Latané, 1981). Others influence is based on how people around us behave, 
what they can forgive, and someone’s internal standard and sanctions for good conduct 
(Cialdini & Trost, 1998).   
In a classical experiment of conformity, Asch (1955) showed that the influence of 
social pressure can be so strong to reduce subjects’ trust in their own visual perception. When 
a group of three or more confederates were unanimously providing a clearly incorrect answer, 
32% more participants gave the incorrect answer about the length of a series of lines 
compared to situations where there was no pressure to conform. Similarly, Darley and Latané 
(1968) illustrated the strength of social influence when they described the “bystander effect.” 
In emergency situations, the bigger the number of bystanders, the smaller the probability that 
they will help people in need. The authors explained that, since every person is waiting for 
others to intervene, they infer that there is no need for help because somebody else will 
intervene if needed.  
In most of the western countries conforming to others opinions is considered a 
weakness, but in fact, it can be effective and time-saving because group consensus is often 
the most reliable route to goal strategy (Cialdini & Trost, 1998; Festinger, 1954). Consensus 
indicates correctness, so whenever there are different sources that hold the same position and 
there are no other plausible explanations, it is an easy heuristic to assume that those sources 
are likely to be correct (Asch, 1955; Cialdini, 1993; Ross, Bierbrauer & Hoffman, 1976). 
There are also situations, like in the Asch’s study where it is more convenient for participants 
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to hold on their opinion, but, according to Cialdini and Trost (1998), such an extreme form of 
conformism is not easily found out of the laboratory context. First of all, it is quite 
implausible that, in a similar situation, everyone beside the respondent would accept others’ 
wrong statement regarding to the length of certain lines, and unanimity is of a crucial 
importance in conformism: if one of the group participants is against the group opinion the 
subject might think that the group opinion is not an absolute truth, so he/she might deviate 
from it (Cialdini & Trost, 1998). Second, social influence is less strong in private responses 
rather than public responses (Deutsch & Gerard, 1955), which means that for many issues 
people would conform less if the responses are private. 
2.1 Informational vs. normative social influence 
There are two main ways in which social influence exerts its effect on our behavior: a 
person agrees with others because he/she considers the information obtained from them as an 
evidence of reality (informational social influence) or because he/she wants to conform to 
others’ positive expectations (normative social influence; Deutsch & Gerard, 1955; Goodwin, 
Kukucka, & Hawks, 2013; Lord, Lee, & Choong, 2001; Nolan, Schultz, Cialdini, Goldstein, 
& Griskevicius, 2008). Informational social influence arises from people’s desire to know 
what is right, whereas normative social influence arises from people’s need to feel accepted 
by others. Furthermore, informational social influence affects behavior when there are 
ambiguous correct answers whereas normative social influence arises even when correct 
answers are relatively unambiguous (Asch, 1951; Sherif, 1935). In this case, conforming to 
others expectations leads to feelings of self-esteem and self-approval, while non-conforming 
leads to feelings of anxiety or guilt (Deutsch & Gerard, 1955). These type of feelings are 
based on individuals prior experiences. For example, when a child conforms to his parents 
expectations he gains their approval, and that becomes a source of satisfaction and positive 
feelings. Lastly, when a task is considered important, from a subjective point of view, 
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informational social influence increases and normative social influence decreases (Baron, 
Vandello & Brunsman, 1996). 
2.2 Three categories of social influence 
According to Kelman (1961) there are three type of responses to social influence which 
are compliance, identification, and internalization. Although the changes in attitudes and 
actions produced by the induced behavior may appear the same, differences between them 
correspond to differences in the process. The determinants of the three processes can be 
distinguished from one another in terms of the importance of the anticipated effect, the power 
of the influencing agent, and the manner in which the induced response has become 
predominant.  
When individuals conform to the expectations of another to receive a reward (or not 
receive a punishment), but they actually keep their distinct opinion private, it is considered as 
compliance. The major component of compliance is power: people are more willing to 
comply with someone who’s higher in the social hierarchy since he/she has more power. 
Furthermore, people are more willing to comply when they are in a good mood (Isen, Clark, 
& Schwartz, 1976; George & Brief, 1992). In other situations, compliance is used to receive a 
favor from someone after doing something for them (reciprocity norm; Cialdini, 1993).  
Identification takes place when individuals adopt a behavior from someone they like 
because that behavior is associated with a satisfying self-defining relationship to the other, 
which means that the role of that relationship between the individual and the other is 
beneficial to the individual self-concept (Kelman, 1961). The individual believes in the 
responses which he adopts through identification, but their specific content is more or less 
irrelevant. He adopts the induced behavior because it is associated with the desired 
relationship.  
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Finally, there is internalization when the individual is affected by social influence 
because others’ opinions or behaviors are perceived as "inherently conducive to the 
maximization of his values"; that is, the content is perceived as being inherently instrumental 
to the attainment of his/her goals (Kelman, 1961, p. 65). The individual accepts the induced 
behavior because it is congruent with his value system and tend to be integrated with the 
individual’s existing values. Credibility of the source is of a particular importance here.   
In an attempt to connect these notions to the type of social influence described by 
Deutsch and Gerard (1955), we can relate informational social influence to a process that 
leads to enhancing individual knowledge. This means that the individual would make others 
knowledge his own, therefore internalizing it. Instead normative influence could be the result 
of either a process of compliance or identification. If the individual is interested to gain a 
reward or avoid a punishment the normative influence is more likely to take the shape of 
compliance. However, if the individual wants to enhance his self-esteem and he is expected 
to associate himself with a positive referent for that, the normative influence is more likely to 
take the shape of identification.  
2.3 Social impact theory 
Latané (1981) created a mathematical model which explains conformity based on 
number, strength, and immediacy of other people in the group. According to his research, 
when people are exposed to informational social influence, as the number of the people in the 
group increases each additional individual becomes less powerful at influencing others. 
Latané (1981) explained that in this case, the impact grows in approximate proportion to the 
square root of the number of people involved. On the contrary, when people are exposed to 
normative social influence the group size matters: the larger the group, the stronger the 
pressure to conform.  
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The strength of the group depends on how important the group is to individuals. The 
more meaningful the group is to someone, more likely people are to conform to it (Aronson, 
Wilson & Akert, 2007). Because of this, the strength of the influence depends mainly from 
the characteristics of the individuals who are the sources of influence. For example, in a 
working environment, a co-worker has less influence on someone than the supervisor. 
Furthermore, normative social influence is stronger when there is agreement among the group 
members.  
Immediacy indicates that social influence depends on the type of relationship between 
the source of influence and the target. Factors like clarity of the communication channels, the 
lack of barriers, and most importantly, closeness in space make the social influence more 
immediate (Latané, 1996). For example, it is easier to receive a suggestion from a roommate 
rather than someone who is talking on the television. Latané (1996) clarified that if other 
factors are held constant, influence is proportional to the immediacy of the source of 
influence.  
Social impact theory suggests that the greatest level of influence occurs when there are 
several people in close proximity and there is high group strength. In addition, this theory 
reveals that social presence is an inverse function of the number of targets, proximity and 
group strength. Latané (1996) also showed how being influenced by nearby rather than 
faraway people gives rise to local patters and creates subcultures. Based on a computer 
simulation designed to conduct a dynamic simulation of social influence the author showed 
how complex systems exhibit four forms of self-organization: clustering, correlation, 
consolidation, and continuing diversity.  
2.4 Cialdini’s “Weapons of influence” 
Later on, Cialdini and Goldstein (2004) outlined  three core motivations that determine 
individual’s susceptibility to social influence: 1) accuracy, which describes peoples’ desire to 
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perceive accurately the reality in order to achieve effectively their goals, 2) affiliation, which 
relates to the peoples’ desire to be part of a social group, and 3) maintenance of a positive 
self-concept related to the positive image of oneself. Based on these motivations Cialdini 
(1984) defined six principles which he considers as “weapons of influence”. Some of them 
are more related to informational social influence, instead others are more related to 
normative social influence; under certain circumstances they are considered as compliance, 
but people can also identify with the source of information and internalize the information; 
and lastly, the number of people of the influence source, its strength and immediacy can be 
applied to the use of all these principles in different measures.  
a) Reciprocity: in many societies people are taught to return the favors they receive from 
others. Based on the reciprocity principle, people feel obligated to do so, otherwise they 
would feel indebted. For example, if someone offers to give you a ride, and the next time 
he/she asks you the same type of favor, most probably you would feel bad if you do not 
respond positively to this request. Garner (2005) sent to one-third of participants some 
surveys with a hand-written sticky note requesting completion, one-third with a blank sticky 
note, and one-third without a sticky note. The response rate to the survey was 69% of those 
who received a hand-written sticky, 43% of those who received a blank sticky note, and 34% 
of those who did not receive a sticky note with their survey.  
b) Commitment and consistency: Cialdini (1984) explains that once a person takes a 
decision, he/she prefers to be consistent with it. For some reason people have this interior 
desire for consistency; they associate consistency with strength and inconsistency with 
weakness. For example, if someone starts supporting a charity project, he/she is more 
inclined to keep supporting it rather than change, because that would probably mean that 
he/she did not make the right choice previously. Obviously, public commitments have a 
much higher chance of inducing people to behave in a consistent way than private ones.  
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c) Social proof: when people are not sure what is the best thing to do, they are more 
likely to conform to what others do. This principle is particularly related to the concept of 
informational social influence. Goldstein, Cialdini, and Griskevicius (2008) ran an 
experiment to see which type of signs would have most encourage Arizona hotel visitors to 
reuse towels. The percentage of those who reused towels was higher when it was printed on 
signs positioned on washroom towel racks “Join your fellow guests in helping to save the 
environment. Almost 75% of guests who are asked to participate in our new resource saving 
program do help by using their towels more than once.” (44%) then when it was written 
“Help save the environment. You can show your respect for nature and help save the 
environment by reusing your towels during your stay.” (35%).  
d) Liking: people are more willing to accept something if they like the person who is 
advocating a particular stance. It can be someone who is similar to them or whom they are 
physically attracted. This principle is mostly related to how our emotions work. According to 
another study by Garner (2005) those who received a survey from someone with a similar-
sounding name were nearly twice as likely to fill out and return a packet as those who 
received the surveys from dissimilar sounding names (56% compared to 30%), and previous 
research has found that similarity is strongly related to liking (Amodio & Showers,  2005). 
e) Authority: authoritarian figures have a strong influence on peoples’ decisions. 
Professional uniforms (e.g., a doctor’s overall), job titles, or even accessories like cars can 
have an effect on peoples’ behaviors. Apparently, many of us are more likely to believe 
something when it is reported by individuals who have some kind of authority or expertise. A 
classic experiment that evidences this principle is the one of Milgram in 1974. Two-third of 
participants in Milgram’s study inflicted a full dose of 450 volts to some “victims” (which 
were actors in reality) because they were receiving instructions by people dressed in white lab 
coats which emphasized their high authority.  
 
 
29 
 
f)  Scarcity: this principle describes that people are more attracted to something when its 
availability is limited. For example, in 1985, the Coca-Cola Company created a new formula 
called “New Coke”. Their taste tests indicated that the people preferred more the new Coke 
than the old one. Later, when the company replaced the old Coke with the new Coke the first 
one became peoples’ favorite, because they could not have it anymore (Mowen, 1988). 
Nevertheless, these principles do not always work similarly but they depend from the 
nature of the influence attempt (whether it is interactive or static), the amount of prior 
exposure between the influence agent and target, and whether the influence agent is perceived 
as a member of the target’s ingroup (Guadagno & Cialdini, 2005).  
2.5 Minority influence  
So far we have been talking about social influence, implicitly meaning that it depends 
on the actions of a majority. However, societies mentality changes over time and new ideas 
often reflect the rise of a minority viewpoint, which eventually the rest of the group accepts 
later. The influence of a larger group on a smaller one is defined as majority influence, but a 
minority can influence a larger group, too. Minority influence is usually based on 
informational social influence (Wood, Lundgren, Ouellette, Busceme, & Blackstone, 1994). 
Past studies have also shown that exposure to minority views stimulates divergent and 
original thinking (Nemeth & Kwan, 1985). This because majority views make individuals 
feel much more stress than minority views and, as a consequence, induce individuals to give 
more conventional responses and inhibit the original ones.  
According to Moscovici (1980) minority influence is stronger if the opinions of the 
minority members are consistent, confident, unbiased, and resist to social pressure. He 
considers consistency the most important factor and underlines two types of it: consistency 
over time, which means that opinions should not change over time, and consistency between 
members, which means that all members in the minority share similar opinions. Furthermore, 
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minorities have good chances to influence the majority if they induce majorities to think more 
analytically about an argument; if they are seen as more cooperative and reasonable; if they 
are flexible and try to consider others point of view; and if majorities identify more with 
minority’s members (McLeod, Baron, Marti, & Yoon, 1997; Smith, Tindale, & Dugoni, 
1996). 
Conversion theory (Moscovici, 1980) says that when minorities judgments show that 
they have a clear view of reality, they are committed to this view, and they are unwilling to 
compromise with respect to their position, it creates a conflict between the source and the 
target of influence. This conflict is intensified when there is no easy way to reject it and, if 
someone encounters a minority with a different viewpoint from their own, they are motivated 
to reduce this conflict. Differently from majorities processes, minorities opinions go through 
a validation process and a careful examination of their arguments because they break the 
unanimity of the majority. Only in this way, the minority point of views can capture the 
attention of a majority. Finally, trying to understand what the minority believes, the majority 
starts believing in the same things. 
2.6 Culture, social influence, and prosocial behavior 
There have been over 20 cross-cultural studies of conformity using Asch’s 
experimental design. To some extent, culture seems to have an impact in social behavior 
(Milgram, 1963). In particular, moral issues are usually under the influence of the culture to 
which individuals belong because they do not have universally consistent norms (Hofstede, 
1991). Ferrell, Gresham, and Fraedrich (1989) demonstrated that the social and cultural 
environment affects moral perception, moral evaluation, moral judgment, moral intention, 
and moral behavior. According to Hofstede (1984) there are four major cultural dimensions 
that establish peoples’ values and behavior: individualism, power distance, masculinity, and 
uncertainty-avoidance.  
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The first dimension, individualism-collectivism describes the difference between 
individualistic societies where people are primary concerned with their own interest and their 
immediate family, and collectivist societies in which people believe that individuals belong to 
many “in-groups” (extended family and different organizations) that help protecting the 
interest of their members (Hofstede, 1984). People in individualist cultures are susceptible to 
loneliness, and people in collectivist cultures can have a strong fear of rejection. The fear of 
rejection might determine the fact that collectivist countries tend to show higher levels of 
conformity than individualist countries (Bond & Smith, 1996). Besides this, individualistic 
countries emphasize the desirability of individuals to be responsible for their own well-being 
and have a sense of personal identity. Regarding to the connection of this dimension with 
prosocial behavior, Kemmelmeier, Jambor, and Letner, (2006) found that giving is more 
common in individualistic rather than collectivistic societies. 
The second dimension of a culture, which is power distance, is related to the extent to 
which the less powerful individuals in a society accept inequality in power and consider it as 
normal. Arabic-speaking nations, most of Latin America (except Argentina), Russia, and 
nearly all of Asia are high in power distance, instead most of Europe, Canada, Australia and 
Israel are low in power distance. Japan and Mediterranean-Europe fall in the middle range. 
Hofstede (1984) found that the power-distance index is positively correlated with conformity. 
Brammer & Pavelin (2005) argued that a country like US where power-distance is low, and 
individualism is high, represents a good combination for charity contributions. Such a 
combination promotes a greater tendency for social issues to be addressed through individual 
contributions, rather than collective actions like governmental taxes.  
The third dimension, masculinity, is considered by Hofstede (1984) as the expectation 
of a society for men to be assertive, ambitious, competitive, materialistic, and powerful. On 
the contrary, women are expected to serve, care for children, and focus on relationships. 
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Feminine cultures accept an overlap between these two roles for both sexes. This dimension 
of society makes easier to understand the results described by Nelson, Brunel, Supphellen, 
and Manchanda (2006) who found that men in masculine cultures preferred the egoistic 
motives to help and women preferred the altruistic motives to help, whereas, in feminine 
cultures, it was the opposite. Furthermore, given that more masculine societies place greater 
value on men achievements, and their motivation is related to innovativeness and assertive 
acquisition of money and power, conformity is lower for them, particularly under the 
surveillance of others, because in this situation others can make a judgment about their 
masculinity based on the society prototype (Eagly, Wood, & Fishbaugh, 1981).  
Finally, the uncertainty-avoidance dimension is explained as a difficulty that certain 
cultures have to accept the absence of structure, rules, and predictability of events. These 
cultures are emotional, aggressive, security-seeking, and try to adopt beliefs of absolute truth. 
Higher levels of uncertainty make people less willing to try new experiences, and, as a result, 
more prone to conformity (Jankowicz, 1994). Also, higher levels of uncertainty-avoidance 
suggest a lower human orientation and compassion. Brodbeck, Frese and Javidan (2002) have 
found that the German culture, which shows high level of uncertainty-avoidance, believes to 
sayings like “tough on the issue, tough on the person”, which means that in this culture to be 
successful, reach goals and avoid risk, people retain appropriate to avoid sensibility toward 
other’s needs.  
An important point to discuss here is how the culture can influence the sensibility 
toward others need and the moral behavior of its members. Early behaviorists suggested that 
children can learn prosocial behavior through conditioning. Hartmann et al., (1976) found 
that reinforcement and punishment can promote prosocial behavior and Aronfreed (1970) 
found the same results in relation to empathy. Additionally, Bandura (1986) claimed that 
people can learn to behave morally through observation and verbal communication. Children 
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usually imitate their parents or other important people in their life, and adults imitate friends 
or people they admire. Furthermore, Bandura (1986) said that people learn by experience 
which factors are morally relevant and how much value to attach to each of them. Some 
recent studies argue that people can be encouraged to be prosocial since a very early age (0-3 
years old; McMullen et al, 2009). Finally, Krebs (1970) described that providing 'models' 
(e.g. a celebrity seen to be offering support) can also influence contributions by leading to the 
creation of social norms thereby legitimizing and encouraging giving behavior. 
2.7 Social influence in charity giving 
Different theories have been proposed in the charitable-giving context to explain the 
relationship between others’ contributions and an individual’s own contribution (Shang & 
Croson, 2009). On the one hand, substitute models state that, as the contributions of others 
increase, one’s own contribution should decrease (Andreoni, 1990; Becker, 1974; Roberts, 
1984; Warr, 1982). On the other hand, complement models state that individuals use the 
contributions of others as an indicator of the appropriate contribution. Therefore, if others 
donations increase, these “observers” should give more, too (Bernheim, 1994; Croson, 2007; 
Shang & Croson, 2009; Sugden, 1984; Vesterlund, 2003). In substitute models, individuals 
use others’ contributions as a guide to maximize the equality between private and public 
goods, while in complement models they use others’ contributions as a reference point to 
understand how to behave when the proper action is unclear.  
On this latter point, Desmet and Feinberg (2003) specified that the relation between 
what one asks for (the donation appeal) and what one receives is difficult to anticipate. 
Furthermore, the amount of money that people decide to donate when presented with a 
charitable-giving request is established by both internal and external resources. Internal 
resources are what someone knows by herself (i.e., if they have previous donation 
experiences how well  their money was managed, how much the donation helped to change 
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the situation, how grateful the receiver was), whereas external resources are what someone is 
told about a certain charitable-giving situation (Sherif, Taub, & Hovland, 1958). People 
usually do not ignore external resources, since they can be instrumental in judging the 
appropriate donation amount, particularly when the situation is ambiguous (Crutchfield, 
1955).  
In addition, people are influenced the most about the amount of money they decide to 
donate when they believe others’ judgments are valid and reliable (Abrams, Wetherell, 
Cochrane, Hogg, & Turner, 2011; Cason & Mui, 1998). If the request is too high, people may 
perceive the proposed donation amount as unfair or excessive, and compliance rates will 
decrease (Weyant and Smith, 1987). Several authors suggested that legitimizing really small 
contributions can improve compliance in face-to-face forms of solicitation (Reingen, 1978; 
Shearman & Yoo, 2007; Weyant, 1984), meanwhile Weyant and Smith (1987) concluded that 
this approach is less effective in other less personal forms of fundraising. If the anchor is low, 
refusing to help may be perceived as socially embarrassing (Briers, Pandelaere, & Warlop, 
2007). Fraser, Hite and Sauer (1988) found that solicitors can improve responses to charity 
giving by either making a moderately large, but believable, anchorpoint request or by adding 
a phrase to legitimize paltry increases response magnitudes. The first increases the size of 
response, and the second increases the rate of compliance.  
2.8 Summary 
People are influenced by others because they want to be liked and accepted by them, or 
because they do not have the required information about a certain topic (Deutsch & Gerard, 
1955; Epley & Gilovich, 2006; Latané, 1981). Kelman (1961) suggested that the importance 
of the anticipated effect, the power of the influencing agent, and the manner in which the 
induced response has become predominant defines three different types of social influence 
which are compliance, identification and internalization. Furthermore, Latané (1981) created 
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a mathematical model which allows to calculate the social influence based on the number of 
influence sources, their strength, and immediacy (the type of relationship between the source 
and the target of influence). Cialdini (2003) combines all these theoretical foundations to 
create six practical principles of influence, which he defines as “weapons of influence”.  
Social influence can be created by a majority or a minority group, and culture is 
strongly connected to it (Ferrell et al., 1989; Hofstede, 1991; Milgram, 1963). Two main 
models of social influence in charity giving have been proposed so far: substitute models and 
complement models (Andreoni, 1990; Becker, 1974; Bernheim, 1994; Croson, 2007; Roberts, 
1984; Shang & Croson, 2009; Sugden, 1984;  Vesterlund, 2003; Warr, 1982). The first ones 
state that people usually tend to match others’ donation about a charity cause, instead 
complement models state the opposite: people should donate less if others are already giving 
and donate more if others are not yet donating. The present dissertation aims to test which of 
these models prevails. Participants could have been influenced by others because they were 
not sure about their own opinion, or because they liked the reference group, but the most 
important thing is to understand if participants will follow the same direction of others 
opinions, and if yes, to what extent.  
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3. GROUP BELONGNINGNESS 
3.1 Group development  
A group is defined as two or more people who interact with each-other, have a common 
goal and collectively have a sense of unity (Tajfel & Turner, 1979). Groups are formed based 
on social needs, security needs, esteem needs, proximity, attraction, or economic benefits 
(Crockenberg, 1981; Festinger, 1954; Frederickson & Turner, 2003; Granovetter, 2005; 
Hogg, 1992). According to Tuckman (1965) the process of a group formation goes through 
four main steps which will be described below. Each step builds on the previous one and 
prepares for the performing stage and skipping any of these steps effects performing 
negatively. 
1. In the first step, called forming, group members get to know each-other and there is 
no trust yet. Team members typically wonder how they fit into the group and what 
kind of expectations are expected of them because of their membership in the group 
(Maples, 1988). Many group members experience dependence on each other and 
have uncertainties about the driving motivations for the change (Fall & Wejnert, 
2005). In this stage individuals are starting to collect information and impressions, 
and they also are interested to be accepted by others. Group members avoid serious 
issues and first impressions are decisive.  
2. In the second stage, called storming, confusion and frustration are at the highest 
level, because the group starts to actually face the problems it is supposed to solve 
(Fall & Wejnert, 2005). This is a really delicate stage because in case group 
members do not show tolerance there is a high risk for the group to fail. However, it 
is a prerequisite for the subsequent development of a stronger cohesion and 
cooperation (Tuckman & Jensen, 1977). In some groups storming can finish 
quickly, but in others it can last forever. Group members start to identify their 
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resources, express their different ideas, feelings, and opinions, and improve 
communication skills and how to react to leadership. Roles and responsibilities are 
articulated, problem solving does not work well yet, competition is high because 
people push for position and power and team spirit is still not very strong.  
3. At the third stage, norming, the group finally finds an agreement about a common 
plan. Tasks are divided within group members, and they share vision, values, goals, 
and expectations. Decisions are made through negotiation and consensus building, 
the team has all the resources for reaching the goals, team confidence is high, 
leaders reinforce team behavior, and the team gains commitment from all members 
on direction and goals. Because group members are so open to one another, this 
becomes a problem-solving stage (Bonebright, 2010) 
4. In the last stage, named performing, roles are specific, goals are clear, and results 
are noted. Team members are now motivated and competent to carry out their role 
(Tuckman & Jensen, 1977). Members work collaboratively, care about each-other, 
a unique identity is established, and members are interdependent. The team feels 
very motivated, is very efficient, individuals take pleasure in the success of the 
team, and there is high trust in other group members.  
Group processes and outcomes depend on many constructs like the group composition 
(Bell, 2007), hierarchy within the group (Halevy, Chou, & Galinsky, 2011), group size 
(Ingham, Levinger, Graves, & Peckham, 1974), roles (Leavitt, 1951), and group norms 
(Douglas & McGarty 2001). However, the construct which has more attracted researchers 
interest over several years is group cohesiveness (Festinger, Schachter, & Back, 1950; Hogg, 
1992; Jung & Sosik, 2002; Martens & Peterson, 1971; Mullen & Copper, 1994). Festinger 
and colleagues (Festinger et al., 1950) described group cohesion as “the total field of forces 
which act on members to remain in the group.” (p. 164). The group cohesiveness theory 
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(Festinger et al., 1950) predicts that people who invest in their group will become committed 
to it and seek for information that defend their commitment till they resolve the discomfort. 
Cohesiveness is enhanced by the sense of belongingness in a group, when there is a special 
kind of attraction between members, and when there is a sense of responsibility to the group 
effort. A cohesive work environment increases the likelihood of employee satisfaction and 
lack of cohesion is certain to result in unnecessary stress and tension among the group 
members.  
Later on, Hogg (1992) developed the self-categorization theory. According to his 
theory group identification triggers a de-individuated state in which group members reference 
their attitudes and behaviors to the prototypical norms that are most characteristic of the 
group. Group members bring their attitudes and behaviors into conformity with their ingroup 
prototypes and, thus, generate the positive attitudinal consensus and behavioral uniformity 
that are indicative of cohesive groups. Interpersonal interactions are not theoretically central 
in the mechanism that Hogg (1992) describes. 
3.1.1 Why people form social groups 
Tuckman (1965) specified that the main reason why people join groups is to reach their 
goals, and this is particularly true for formal groups. Goal-setting theory suggests that goals 
are associated with enhanced performance because they mobilize effort, direct attention, and 
encourage persistence and strategy development (Locke & Latham, 1990). Locke and Latham 
(1990) found that specific and difficult goals led to better task performance than vague or 
easy goals. Further, to ensure a progress is achieved it is important that participants in a group 
with a common goal are clearly aware of what is expected from them.  
In a classic experiment called Robert Cave study (Sherif, Harvey, White, Hood, & 
Sherif, 1961) the experimenters divided in two groups some 12 year old boys who registered 
in a summer camp. Initially groups were kept apart for one week. In the second week the 
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experimenters introduced some competitive activities between them like baseball and touch-
football. Until the third week, there was genuine hostility between these two groups. In the 
third week, the experimenters arranged intergroup contact under noncompetitive conditions 
and noticed that this mere contact was not sufficient to change the relations between the two 
groups, but only when a new common goal was established attitudes changed and became 
positive. The main result of this study was that superordinate goals were able to bring 
together the group more than any other technique tried by the experimenter before that. 
Other authors emphasized that the most important reason driving people’s decision to 
become part of a group (particularly an informal one) is related to their need for affiliation, 
social comparison, and self-esteem (Baumeister & Leary, 1995; Schachter, 1959). The need 
to belong is one of the fundamental human motivation and it effects emotional and cognitive 
well-being (Epstein, 1992; Maslow, 1968). Ostrom, Carpenter, Sedikides, and Li (1993) 
found that information about ingroup is processed based on the personal attributes, instead 
information about the outgroup is processed based on group attributes. Consistently, Tice, 
Butler, Muraven, and Stillwell (1995) found that when people interact with friends (vs. 
strangers) they change the way they present information about themselves: with close friends 
people are more modest and tend to be more original, instead with strangers they rely on self-
enhancement. According to several studies, people with high levels of intimacy motivation 
tend to enjoy higher levels of happiness and subjective well-being and, on the contrary, 
exclusion from social groups may provoke anxiety (Baard, Deci, & Ryan, 2004; Barden, 
Garber, Leiman, Ford, & Masters, 1985; McAdams & Bryant, 1987; Ryan & Deci, 2000).  
Furthermore, Turner, Sachdev, and Hogg (1983) emphasize social attraction as another 
important component of group formation, and recently, the attention is moving toward the 
economic benefits of group formation (Granovetter, 2005; Heckman, Stixrud, & Urzua, 2006; 
Pretty, 2003). 
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3.1.2 Formal vs. informal groups 
Groups can be broadly classified in two types: formal and informal (Axelrod, 1956; 
Deaux, Reid, Mizrahi, & Ethier, 1995; Schein, 1965). The first ones have a structure, well-
defined tasks, and they are created consciously and deliberately. When objectives are fulfilled 
these groups disappear. Instead, informal groups are based on interest and friendship, they do 
not have explicit regulations, and they are mostly created spontaneously, without a conscious 
analysis. Formal groups tend to be much larger in size compared to informal groups. Also, 
formal groups have a formal structure, instead in informal groups everyone is more or less 
equal. Finally, communication in formal groups is prescribed through certain channels, 
instead for informal groups there are many informal channels to communicate between group 
members. A study by Sheldon and Bettencourt (2002) found that members of formal groups 
felt less personal autonomy, but more group distinctiveness, compared to informal group 
members. Furthermore, groups in which everyone is connected to everyone else through 
informal socializing outside of a formal organization are expected to have more bounded 
solidarity, stronger reciprocity norms, and greater trust (Burt, 2000; Coleman, 1990).  
3.2 Group influence on individuals behavior 
As mentioned before, individuals become part of a group for many reasons like esteem 
needs, proximity, attraction, economic benefits, or to reach different type of goals. Most of 
the times groups are really useful to help people reach these goals, but other times, group 
dynamics lead to some unexpected phenomena that oblige the group members to confront 
with new issues in addition the main ones that actually represent the real motive of the group 
existence. Similar phenomena are social facilitation and social loafing. 
3.2.1 Social facilitation 
Others presence can be a great stimulus to improve the performance of an individual 
(Zajonc, 1965). Previous studies have found that increased population intensity is associated 
 
 
41 
 
with  adrenocortical activity and endocrine manifestation, which in turn is associated with the 
arousal enhancement (Leiderman & Shapiro, 1964; Selye, 1946). For example, Triplett 
(1898) showed how cyclists produced faster times when performing in pairs than when alone. 
Allport (1924) revealed that only when the task was simple, the performance was best in front 
of others. Similarly, Zajonc and colleagues (Zajonc, Heingartner, & Herman, 1969) found 
that simple mazes were completed faster when in the presence of other animals while 
complex mazes were done better when alone. According to Zajonc (1965), the dominant 
response, which is defined as the most common response in a certain situation, is more 
emphasized in the presence of others. When the dominant response is generally correct the 
performance improves, but when the dominant response is generally incorrect (during 
learning usually) it can negatively impact the performance.  
Duval and Wicklund (1972) offered a different explanation related to the others’ 
presence and self-awareness. They proposed that when in front of other people, the 
immediate response is to focus on oneself. This motivates people to compare how he or she 
would perform ideally with how they actually perform. If there is a significant difference 
between the ideal and reality, the subject tries various means of correcting his behavior 
(providing the correct response). However, the positive effect that the presence of others’ can 
have on someone’s performance is limited to easy tasks. Complex tasks require learning and 
searching for an appropriate behavior, and this distracts from the learning process leading to 
performance decrements. Subsequent studies have demonstrated that mechanical recordings 
like videotaping or mirrors can increase evaluation apprehension and self-awareness, causing 
this way a similar effect to the presence of an audience (Constantinou, Ashendorf, & 
McCaffrey, 2002; Gelso & McKenzie, 1973).  
Finally, Baron (1986) suggested that the presence of others leads to increased cognitive 
load which limits the attentional focus on task-relevant stimuli characteristics. Again, 
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performance increases in simple tasks, and decreases in complex tasks because in the latter 
the presence of other people is a distractor and individuals cannot manage all the information 
to which they are presented.  
3.2.2 Social loafing 
In 1913, Ringelmann found for the first time that members of a group reduce their 
performance when contributions are pooled with the other group members. In his first 
experiment, Ringelmann (1913) showed that a group of men did not pull as hard the rope 
when they were in a group compared to when they were alone. However, this experiment 
could not identify if this result was because individuals put less effort or because they could 
not coordinate easily in a group. Only about 60 years later, Ingham and colleagues (Ingham et 
al., 1974) could demonstrate that social loafing was caused by the first rather than the second 
explanation. One of the main causes of this effect is considered to be the concept of de-
individualization, which is a person’s loss of its sense of individuality and the reduction of 
normal constraints against deviant behavior. Johnson and Downing (1979) found that the 
effect of group behaviors depends on the specific context. Participants who dressed in Ku 
Klux Klan robes shocked a research confederate more, but participants who dressed as nurses 
actually shocked less regardless of whether they were identifiable or anonymous. The authors 
explained these results as a product of contextual cues, namely the costumes. In general, 
social loafing is less likely to occur when: individuals find the task important or meaningful; 
believe that their own efforts are necessary for a successful outcome; the group is cohesive; 
people believe that their own performances can be identified and evaluated by themselves or 
by others (Forsyth, 2009; Karau & Williams, 1993; Kerr & Bruun, 1983).  
According to Robbins (1995) there might also be another explanation to the reason why 
people decide to put less effort when they are doing a group performance: individuals do not 
want to be the only ones who puts effort on a task, so they wait to see how much effort others 
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are putting in the task before they start doing the same. Furthermore, if group members feel 
that other members are not doing enough they will lower their effort, in order to match what 
others are doing (Jackson & Harking, 1985). Going back to the difference between 
complement and substitute models described above, this explanation is in line with the former 
since it entails the decision by individuals to donate a similar sum as other members of their 
group. On the contrary, substitute models would predict a differentiation between what 
individuals and their group fellows do (individuals should donate less when they know that 
others have already given money to the same charitable cause).  
Based on this literature, to avoid social loafing it would be useful to increase the 
identifiability of group members giving to each of them a particular task, underlining the 
importance of their task, give to individuals the opportunity to choose their own task, and 
make group members believe that their effort is important for a successful performance. 
3.3 Intergroup relations 
Intergroup relations refer to the way in which people in groups perceive, think about, 
feel about, and act toward people in other groups (Hogg, 2003). Conflictual relations between 
groups can vary from some friendly rivalry to deep hate and violent conflict. Some early 
studies hypothesized if there might be an authoritarian personality syndrome related to 
aggressive attitude toward the other groups (Adorno, Frenkel-Brunswik, Levinson, & 
Sanford, 1950; Titus & Hollander, 1957). Adorno and collaborators (1950) suggested that 
emotional manipulative experiences during childhood may provoke this syndrome. On the 
other hand Pettigrew (1958) concluded that prejudice and intergroup relations are not a result 
of the personality, but of the society where the individual is grown, which legitimizes 
prejudice. Further, a more recent theory (social dominance theory; Pratto, Sidanius,  
Stallworth, & Malle, 1994) described that there might be an individual difference related to 
how people accept or reject societal ideologies.  
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A second stream of research explained intergroup behavior based on the goal relations 
between groups (Blake & Mouton, 1961; Fisher, 2006; Sherif et al., 1961). As described 
above in the Robert Cave study, when groups have a conflictual goal between them they have 
higher chances to become rivals, but when a common goal is activated, the conflicts between 
groups disappear, and a new common group emerges.  
An important consequence of group differences is inter-group bias, which is a 
systematic tendency to evaluate one’s own membership group more favorably than a non-
membership group (the outgroup). This bias brings consequences in the cognition 
(stereotyping), attitude (prejudice), and behavior (discrimination). Most of the time, 
individuals develop automatic category representations of their own group and outgroups. 
These representations are characterized by abstract features, assumed to be true from the 
group as a whole, and are also known as group stereotypes (Fiske & Taylor, 1991; Hamilton 
& Sherman, 1996). Stereotypes are a basic component of prejudice and ingroup bias, where 
people tends to favor members of one’s group over members of other groups. Furthermore, 
stereotypes contribute to the ultimate attribution error: good acts are attributed to a 
disposition if performed by ingroup members and to situational factors if performed by 
outgroup members, whereas the opposite holds for bad acts (Hewstone & Ward, 1985).  
Intergroup relations are almost always associated with differential status, resources, 
power, prestige, and so forth (Hogg, 2003).  Dominant groups have a good experience from 
this, but small minority groups can carry a stigma which has bad consequences on their self-
concept. Stigmatized individuals possess some attributes which are devalued in specific 
social contexts (Crocker, Major, & Steele, 1998). Because these groups know the negative 
stereotypes that other groups have toward them, they experience stereotype threat, which 
makes them worried about specific important tasks, and in turn, impairs the performance and 
confirms the stereotype (Steele & Aronson, 1995). Stigmatized individuals are vulnerable to 
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low self-esteem, have a sense of reduced efficacy, diminished life satisfaction, and in some 
extreme cases they suffer from depression (Jost & Kramer, 2003).  
In order to overcome intergroup relation problems it was created a contact hypothesis 
which describes that close and pleasant intergroup contact can help build social harmony 
(Allport, 1954; Cook, 1985; Hewstone & Brown, 1986). Although stereotypes can stimulate 
anxiety during intergroup contact (Stephan & Stephan, 1985) encouraging people to 
decategorize themselves can reduce ingroup discrimination (Gaertner, Dovidio, Anastasio, 
Bachman, & Rust, 1993). However, intergroup contact is a difficult situation to manage, and 
should happen under a number of specific conditions like lower anxiety and increased 
perspective taking  (Islam & Hewstone, 1993).  
3.4 The influence of ingroup and outgroup on people’s opinions 
Public good experiments show that individual contribution varies with the mean 
contribution of the group (e.g. Keser & van Winden, 2000; Sutter & Weck-Hannemann, 
2003). People have a natural tendency to feel part of social groups and to categorize other 
individuals as either members of these groups or of an outgroup. Such categorization has 
important implications for decisions related to social issues and can be activated with rather 
subtle and arbitrary manipulations (Tajfel, Billig, Bundy, & Flame, 2006). Ingroup members 
have a stronger influence than outgroup members (Barnum & Markovsky, 2007; Tajfel & 
Turner, 1979). They are likely to be perceived as more trustworthy and are judged more 
positively than outgroup members (Dovidio, Gaertner, Kawakami, & Hodson, 2002; 
Hewstone, Rubin, & Willis, 2002). Furthermore, individuals process arguments that are part 
of a discussion among people belonging to the ingroup more carefully than arguments 
proposed in a discussion among outgroup members (Mackie, Gastardo-Conaco, & Skelly, 
1992), perceive more beliefs in common with an ingroup member rather than an outgroup 
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member (Brown, 1984; Brown & Abrams, 1986) and have a better memory for positive 
information about individuals that belong to their group (Howard & Rothbart, 1980). 
Moreover, Abrams et al. (2011) suggested that feeling like part of an ingroup helps 
when people want to obtain approval because they know what other members expect from 
them. Social identity theory explains that people develop a bias which favors their own group 
because they want to maintain positive self-esteem (Tajfel & Turner, 1979). Furthermore, 
people choose ingroups that maximize their positive social identity (Tajfel, 1978). Tajfel and 
Turner (1979) identified three main processes to describe their theory: 1. Categorization, in 
which the individual builds belongingness categories based on different factors, like gender, 
social position, and nationality, that maximize the similarities between people inside a 
category and the differences from people outside these categories. 2. Identification, in which 
belonging to a category or group provides a psychological base for people’s social identity. 3. 
Social comparison, in which the individual constantly compares the ingroup to the outgroup, 
and considers the first one superior to the second. This last process indicates that it is more 
likely for individuals to be influenced by ingroup, rather than outgroup, behaviors. In 
particular, in the domain of prosocial behavior, a person can be judged negatively for not 
helping, but can also find justifications to explain his or her behavior. In other words, it 
should be easier to ignore the social pressure when the source is the outgroup and less easy to 
ignore the behaviors of other members of the ingroup, whose judgment generally has a 
stronger impact on a person’s self-identity.  
Schervish & Havens (1997) claimed that moral decisions are rooted in the communities 
to which the individual is associated, like family, extended family, friends, associates, and 
different type of community groups. Usually, these are the communities that individuals 
directly benefit as well, so they are motivated to look at their actions and understand which is 
the most suitable action in a specific moral situation. This is consistent with the warm-glow 
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theory (Andreoni, 1990) which shows how important is other people’s presence when 
individuals are interested to make a good impression to them, to earn prestige, social 
approval, and recognition.  
3.5 Helping an ingroup vs. outgroup individual 
When collective identities are salient, categorization becomes the most important 
source for evaluating others (Brewer & Gardner, 1996). Brewer and Gardner (1996) activated 
the sense of  “we”-ness in a group of participants, instead of “they” or “it” in two other 
groups of participants and found that the first group felt greater closeness and responsibility, 
and the emotional response toward others distress was higher. Furthermore, Dovidio, 
Gaertner, Validzic, Motoka, Johnson, & Frazier (1997) found that recategorization reduced 
intergroup bias in evaluations, self-disclosure, and helping. People help more those who are 
similar to themselves and common group membership with a victim will increase the 
likelihood of helping in an emergency settings (Dovidio et al., 1997).  
Keser and van Winden (2000) created two different experimental conditions in which 
the first one (partners condition) the same subjects were playing a repeated public good 
game, and in the other condition (strangers condition) participants played the game changing 
group formations. The authors found that subjects in the partners condition contributed from 
the first part of the game significantly more to the public good than subjects in the strangers 
condition and that subject in the strangers condition showed a continual decay, while those in 
the partners conditions oscillated on a high level until the final parts of the game where they 
decreased the contributions. Keser and van Winden (2000) explained that this results were 
due to conditional cooperation which is characterized by two aspects, future oriented 
behavior and reactive behavior. The first one is dependent on the subjects’ perception of 
future interaction. The tendency to cooperate is greater when subjects anticipate prolonged 
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interaction with subjects of a group. And the second one is based on the reciprocity principle: 
someone’s behavior refers to the average behavior to the group member previously.   
Consistent with these findings, Kogut and Ritov (2011) found that the identifiability 
effect leads to different results for in-groups and out-groups depending on the presence or 
absence of a conflict between the two groups. In rival groups, an unidentified ingroup 
member is helped more than an identified one, while an unidentified outgroup member is 
helped less than an identified one. However, for non-rival groups an identified ingroup 
member is helped more than an unidentified one, while an identified outgroup member is 
helped less than an unidentified one. 
3.6 Summary 
In the third chapter I initially described some basic concepts related to group formation, 
the four steps identified by Tuckman (1965), the two types of social groups (formal vs. 
informal), and the main reasons why people form social groups. Afterwards, it was shown 
that a social group can have different influences on individuals’ performance, like social 
facilitation and social loafing. Social facilitation is related to a better performance in presence 
of others (Allport, 1924; Baron, 1986; Duval & Wicklund, 1972; Triplett, 1898; Zajonc, 
1965), instead social loafing is related to a worse performance when working together with a 
group (Ingham et al., 1974; Johnson & Downing, 1979: Ringelmann, 1913; Robbins, 1995).  
Furthermore,  I explained some important processes like intergroup relations, the 
influence of an ingroup vs. an outgroup member on someone’s opinions, and prosocial 
behavior toward an ingroup vs. an outgroup individual. The need to belong to a social group 
develops an ingroup bias and makes individuals more influenced by the ingroup opinion 
rather than outgroup opinion.  
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4. PURPOSE AND OUTLINE 
In the present dissertation I examined how the use of anchors influences charity 
giving behavior. The anchors selected in the current studies are not just irrelevant numbers, 
but they indicate the average donation of a group of people. Therefore, anchoring is applied 
in a way that exploits two additional effect from social psychology and decision-making: 
social influence and group belongingness. Previous research has shown that the way others 
influence our charity giving behaviors is categorized in two main models, which are 
substitute and complement models (Andreoni, 1990; Becker, 1974; Bernheim, 1994; Croson, 
2007; Roberts, 1984; Shang & Croson, 2009; Sugden, 1984;  Vesterlund, 2003; Warr, 1982). 
Substitute models describe that when others contributions increase, someone’s own 
contribution decreases, instead complement models claim that when others contributions 
increase, someone’s own contribution increases as well. Furthermore, the literature shows 
that the influence from ingroup members is stronger than the influence exerted by outgroup 
members (Barnum & Markovsky, 2007; Howard & Rothbart, 1980; Mackie et al., 1992; 
Tajfel & Turner, 1979), and people are more willing to help ingroup members rather than 
outgroup members (Dovidio et al., 1997; Keser & van Winden, 2000; Kogut & Ritov, 2007, 
Ritov & Kogut, 2011).  
The present dissertation aims to clarify which of the two models (substitute vs. 
complement) explains better charity behavior, how anchors  related to the charity behavior of 
ingroup vs. outgroup members produce a different influence on donors, how does the 
victim’s group belongingness influence donations decisions, and how affective reactions are 
influenced by the presence of these anchors.  
Even though affective reactions are recognized as the key indicator of prosocial 
behavior (Batson, 1991, Kogut & Ritov, 2005a, 2005b; Slovic, 2007), there is no research 
that describes what happens when social information is presented together with the charity 
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cause. For many reasons (to compare oneself with others, to be liked, to get useful 
information, etc.) social information could be particularly important in prosocial behavior, 
but in the present thesis I am in particular interested to test if this information impairs the 
affective reactions and donation decision for the charity cause or not. 
Hypothesis overview 
In Experiment 1, the anchors related to how much other ingroup members donate to a 
charitable cause were manipulated. The main hypothesis of the first study was that 
participants in the high-anchor condition should donate, on average, more than participants in 
the other two conditions (low-anchor and control condition). In Experiment 2, I added the 
group variable and participants were presented with information about the average donation  
made by either ingroup (Italians) or outgroup (Germans) members. In addition, it was tested 
participants’ tendency to conform to the prosocial behavior of ingroup and outgroup members 
when the target of the charity cause did not belong to any of the two groups used to 
manipulate the reference social information. More specifically, in Experiment 2, the target 
was an outgroup member (African child) for the participants (who were all Italians), 
however, this outgroup was not similar to the one used as a social information source 
(German citizens). The hypothesis of Experiment 2 was that, regardless from the reference 
group, participants should anchor to others’ opinions when the anchor is low. However, when 
the anchor is high, participants should anchor more when this information refers to the 
opinion of other members of their group (ingroup) rather than members of another group 
(outgroup). Experiment 3 provided a replicate of Experiment 2, but this time the target of the 
charity cause was an ingroup member (an Italian child).  
Furthermore, I decided to measure participants’ affective reactions and assess whether 
they varied when the anchors where present or not. Previous research (Kogut & Ritov, 2005a, 
2005b; Small et al., 2007; Dickert et al., 2011) has shown that feelings of empathy and 
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concern are crucial to charitable behavior, but, to my knowledge, there is no literature that 
explains the relation between anchors in charity giving and affective reactions. Based on 
limited-capacity attentional resources theory (Broadbent & Broadbent, 1987; Conway, 1996; 
Raymond, Shapiro, & Arnell, 1992), I hypothesized that anchorpoints presented as social 
information describing others’ donations should reduce affective reactions because they shift  
attention from the victim’s picture and story to the social appropriateness of the decision to 
help. This hypothesis is also consistent with complement models (Bernheim, 1994; Croson, 
2007; Shang & Croson, 2009; Sugden, 1984; Vesterlund, 2003) and the fact that other 
people’s behavior becomes a reference point used to interpret which is the correct behavior in 
situations in which it is not clear how much a person should donate. In other words, people 
should pay more attention to information about others’ donations and attend less to their own 
empathic feelings, since the former is a more reliable information of how much it is worth 
giving (Crutchfield, 1955). 
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5. EXPERIMENT 1 
4.1 Method 
4.1.1 Participants and design  
A hundred thirty-seven students from the University of Padova (M = 19.56, SD = 1.62; 
94 females) completed a paper questionnaire during a lecture break. Participants were 
randomly assigned to one of the three experimental conditions: 50 in the No Anchor 
condition (NA), 47 in the Low Anchor condition (LA), and 40 in the High Anchor condition 
(HA).  
4.1.2 Materials and procedure  
Participants read the story of a child named Elena who was affected by brain damage 
and in need of financial help. After a brief explanation of Elena’s situation, accompanied by 
her picture, participants read a sentence related to their ingroup average donation (other 
Italians), and were asked whether they were willing to donate a sum of money to help her. 
Those who answered yes were then asked how much they were willing to donate. Depending 
on the experimental condition, one of the following statements was reported below the 
picture: “On average, Italians donate €10 to support this project” (LA condition) or “On 
average, Italians donate €90 to support this project” (HA condition). In the NA condition, 
there was no information about the average donation made by other Italians. A prize-draw 
methodology was used to make the donation decision more realistic; one from all participants 
was chosen by chance to win an amount of money equal to €100 minus the amount the 
participant decided to donate to the charity cause in the experiment. 
Mood and happiness. Before reading the scenario, participants completed two 9-point 
items which measured mood (-4 = very bad mood; +4 = very good mood) and happiness (-4 = 
very unhappy; +4 = very happy). Given the positive correlation between the two items (r = 
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.64, p < .001), they were averaged together and it will be called only Mood in the results 
section.  
Affective reactions. (Dickert et al., 2011). After deciding how much they were willing 
to donate, participants responded to six items related to their affective reactions toward the 
scenario (e.g., “I feel worried, upset, or sad thinking about Elena” or “Donating money to 
help Elena makes me feel better”) on 7-point scales ranging from 1 (not at all) to 7 (very 
much). Cronbach’s alpha for these items was .74.  
Participants were also asked to answer a series of control questions: 1) how familiar 
they were with brain-injury illnesses; 2) how important they found the information about the 
average donations made by other Italians; and, 3) how realistic they found the average 
amount donated by other Italians (these last two questions were asked only in the LA and HA 
conditions). Responses were provided on a 7-point scale from 1 (Not at all) to 7 (Very much).  
4.2 Results 
Mood showed a positive correlation with the amount of money donated (r = .20, p = 
.02). Therefore, it was decided to add it as a covariate in the following analyses. Initially, I 
ran a Chi-square analysis to test if there were differences in the Yes-No answers between the 
three experimental conditions. The results indicated that there were no significant differences 
(χ2 (2, 137) = 4.30, p = .12). In all conditions, the majority of participants decided to donate 
(94% Yes in NA condition; 89% Yes in LA condition; 80% Yes in HA condition).  
To test the effect of the anchors on willingness to donate, it was performed an analysis 
of variance with the experimental conditions (LA, HA, and NA) as the independent variable, 
mood as covariate, and donation amount as the dependent variable. In this analysis were also 
included people who did not donate setting their donation amount to zero. Results showed a 
significant effect of condition, F (2,136) = 4.39; p = .01; η2p = .06 (see Figure 1 below). A 
test of planned contrasts revealed that participants in the HA condition (M = 32.22; SD = 
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33.98) donated an average sum of money that was significantly larger than the sum of money 
donated by participants in either the LA (M = 22.13; SD = 23.61) or the NA (M = 19.46; SD 
= 14.98) conditions: respectively, t (134) = 2.44; p = .02; d = .42 for the comparison between 
the HA and NA conditions and t (134) = 1.90; p < .06; d = .42 for the comparison between 
the HA and LA conditions. 
 
Figure 1. Average willingness to donate in the three conditions of Experiment 1 
 
Further, I hypothesized that the presence of the anchor would have had an effect on 
participants’ affective reactions. To assess this hypothesis, it was carried a second analysis of 
variance, which showed a significant effect of the experimental condition on affective 
reactions (F (2,136) = 4.75; p = .01; η2p = .07). Contrast effects indicated that affective 
reactions were significantly more intense in the NA condition (M = 4.60; SD = 1.09) than in 
either the HA (M = 3.98; SD = .92) or the LA (M =  4.17; SD = .95) condition: respectively, t 
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(134) = 2.96; p < .01; d = .51 for the comparison between the NA and HA conditions and t 
(134) = 2.11; p < .04; d = .37 for the comparison between NA and LA conditions. 
Participants were asked whether they were familiar with brain injuries in order to avoid 
the influence of this variable on the anchoring effect. As expected, a further analysis of 
variance did not show any difference in familiarity with brain injuries across the three 
experimental conditions (MNA = 2.60; SDNA = 1.34 versus MLA = 2.17; SDLA = 1.40 versus 
MHA = 2.08; SDHA = 1.35; F (2,136) = 2.32; p = .10; η
2
p = .03). 
Finally, it was executed an analysis of variance to see whether the anchor was 
perceived differently in the two conditions in which it was presented. This analysis showed 
that there was no difference related to how important participants considered others’ donation 
between LA (M = 3.26; SD = 2.04) and HA (M = 2.69; SD= 1.63; F (1,85) = 2.08, p = .15) 
conditions, but there was a significant difference related to how realistic participants found 
the information about other people’s behavior (MLA = 3.81; SDLA = 1.69 and MHA = 2.40; 
SDHA = 1.37, F (1,86) = 17.55, p < .01, η
2
p = .17).  
4.3 Discussion 
The goal of Experiment 1 was to show how individuals are influenced by others’ 
behavior when deciding how much they are willing to donate in the presence of a low versus 
a high anchor. Despite the fact that the high anchor (€90) was considered less realistic than 
the low anchor (€10), it still affected donations significantly (MHA = €32.22 and MLA = 
€22.14), a result that is consistent with the anchoring heuristic (Strack & Mussweiler, 1997). 
Moreover, willingness to donate in the LA condition (M = €20.25) was not significantly 
different from the willingness to donate reported by participants in the NA condition (M = 
€17.80). There was also a significant difference between NA and HA condition, which shows 
that the high anchor can increase willingness to donate compared to a situation in which 
participants have no information about others’ donations. 
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Furthermore, participants in both the HA and the LA conditions showed less intense 
affective reactions comparing to the NA condition. It seems that simply providing 
information about other peoples’ donations, regardless of the magnitude of the anchor, makes 
people emotionally less involved with the charity cause. This result can be explained by the 
limited attentional resources theory (Broadbent & Broadbent, 1987; Conway, 1996; Raymond 
et al., 1992). According to this perspective, the anchor attracts attentional resources more 
than the victims’ picture, likely because, for participants, concern regarding adherence to 
social norms is more important than concern about the victim. Moreover, since the anchor is 
a more useful information to understand how much it is worth contributing to the social 
cause, it has the potential to be particularly attention grabbing. Therefore, if the anchor had 
this effect on people’s attention, they may have looked less at the picture of the victim 
experiencing less intense affective reactions in the LA and HA conditions than in the NA 
condition. 
Experiment 1 allowed to show that reporting the average donation made by other 
people can serve as an anchor donors use to decide how much it is worth giving to a 
particular victim. In Experiment 2, it will be tested how the high and low anchors influence 
donations when they refer to the behavior of a people belonging to either an ingroup or an 
outgroup. 
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6. EXPERIMENT 2 
The goal of Experiment 2 was to replicate the difference between high and low anchors 
in modulating donation decisions while at the same time adding the group membership 
dimension. As previously reported, ingroup members have a stronger influence than outgroup 
members (Barnum & Markovsky, 2007; Tajfel & Turner, 1979). Given that nationality seems 
to be a robust ingroup-outgroup indicator, here it is used as a manipulation of group 
membership (Barrett, Wilson, & Lyons, 2003; Hagendoorn, 1995; Lee & Fiske, 2006; Van 
Oudenhoven, Grounewoud, & Hewstone, 1996). 
This time, both the high and low anchor referred to the behavior of either ingroup or 
outgroup members. I hypothesized that, regardless of group membership, willingness to 
donate should be higher in the HA condition than in the LA condition. However, I also 
hypothesized an interaction between high/low anchor and ingroup/outgroup behavior. From 
Experiment 1, it is known that donation amounts in the LA condition are very close to the 
average donations reported in the no-anchor condition, therefore participants should find very 
easy to conform to the low anchor and no difference between ingroup and outgroup should be 
found. On the contrary, when the anchor is high (HA condition), people should not just 
donate more than in the LA condition, but should also be more willing to donate when the 
reference point is the average donation made by members of the ingroup. Therefore, I 
hypothesized that, in the HA condition, willingness to donate should be higher when 
participants are presented with the average donation made by ingroup members rather than 
the average donation made by outgroup members. This should depend on the tendency of an 
individual to conform more to the behavior of individuals belonging to the ingroup because 
of the need to feel in tune with the values and beliefs of one’s own group as well as the 
pressure of being accepted by other ingroup members (Tajfel & Turner, 1979). 
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6.1 Method 
6.1.1 Participants and design 
A hundred ninety-eight students from the University of Padova (mean age M = 21.46, 
SD = 2.59; 117 females) completed a paper questionnaire during class hours. They were 
randomly assigned to one of the four experimental conditions: 49 in the Low Anchor-Ingroup 
condition (LA-I), 49 in the High Anchor-Ingroup condition (HA-I), 51 in the Low Anchor-
Outgroup condition (LA-O), and 49 in the High Anchor-Outgroup  condition (HA-O). 
6.1.2 Materials and procedure  
In Experiment 2, participants read the same scenario as in Experiment 1. However, the 
information about the average donation made by other people could refer to either members 
of an ingroup (Italians) or members of an outgroup (Germans). Ingroup and outgroup were 
decided on the basis of a pilot test in which Italian students perceived themselves as 
belonging more to the Italian group (M = 3.20) than the German one (M = .85), t(20) = 3.81; 
p < .01, d = 1.70. Both participants in the ingroup condition and those in the outgroup 
condition were presented with either a low anchor or a high anchor. Therefore, Experiment 2 
had a 2 x 2 design and four different conditions. Furthermore, I decided to present 
participants with a needy child who did not belong to either the ingroup (Italians) or the 
outgroup (Germans). For this reason, in Experiment 2, participants were asked to help 
Amina, a little African girl (they were also presented with a picture of Amina). Depending on 
the experimental condition, below the image of the child was written “On average, Italians 
(Germans) donate €10 (€70) to support this project.” Because in the previous experiment the 
high anchor was perceived as less realistic than the low anchor and the average donations of 
the participants were more distant from the anchorpoint in the HA condition (€57.88 lower 
than the anchor) compared to the LA condition (€10.13 higher than the anchor), it was 
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decided to lower the high anchor from €90 to €70 in this second experiment and assess if that 
could influence the results. 
As in Experiment 1, participants completed the mood and happiness scales first (Mood; 
r = .61, p < .001), then read the scenario about Amina and decided whether they wanted to 
make a donation and how much they wanted to donate. Finally, participants answered the 
questions related to their affective reactions (Dickert et al., 2011; Cronbach’s alpha for these 
items was .82), and responded to the same control questions as in Experiment 1 (1) how 
familiar they were with brain-injury illnesses; 2) how important they found the information 
about the average donations made by other Italians; and, 3) how realistic they found the 
average amount donated by other Italians.  
6.2 Results 
Unlike Experiment 1, Mood did not correlate with the amount of money participants 
were willing to donate (r = -.006, p = .93). Therefore, it will not be considered as a covariate 
variable in the following analysis. 
First of all, I ran a loglinear analysis to test the Yes/No responses (whether participants 
wanted to donate or not) by Group and Anchor variables. The three-way interaction model 
was significant (χ2 (1) = 9.01, p = .003). Separate chi-square tests for ingroup and outgroup 
showed that when the reference group was German, there were less participants who decided 
to make a donation in the HA condition compared to the LA condition (χ2 = 11.22, p = .001), 
but when the reference group was Italian, there was no significant difference between the HA 
and LA conditions (χ2 = .45, p = .51; see Figure 2). Furthermore, most of the participants in 
the LA-I and HA-I conditions decided to make a donation (87.8% in the LA-I condition 
versus 91.8% in the HA-I condition) therefore replicating the results found in Experiment 1.  
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Figure 2. Proportions of the decision to donate or not in the four conditions 
 
 
To test the role of anchors and group on willingness to donate, it was performed a two 
(Anchor: low vs. high) x two (Group: ingroup vs. outgroup) analysis of variance with the 
amount of the donation as the dependent variable. Like in Experiment 1, even this time 
participants who did not want to make a donation were included, and their donation amount 
was set to zero. This analysis showed a main effect of Anchor, F (1,197) = 22.33, p < . 001, 
ηp
2
 = .10 (see Figure 3). The group variable was not significant, F(1,197) = 1.81, p = .18, 
whereas there was a marginally significant interaction between the Anchor and Group 
factors, F(1,197) = 2.91, p = .09; ηp
2
 = .02 (This is of course significant one tailed, and my 
hypothesis is reasonably considered to be one tailed).  
Participants donated significantly more in the HA condition than in the LA condition. 
Planned contrast effects were executed to investigate the interaction between Anchor and 
Group. The results showed that, both in the ingroup and in the outgroup conditions, 
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participants donated more money when presented with a high donation rather than a low 
donation: respectively, t(197) = 4.53, p < .001, d = .65 for participants presented with average 
donations made by ingroup members and t(197) = 2.15, p = .03, d = .31 for participants 
presented with average donations made by outgroup members. There was no significant 
difference between the two conditions in which participants were presented with the low 
anchor, whereas there was a difference between the two conditions in which participants were 
presented with the high anchor: respectively, t(197) = .26, p = .80, d = .04 when participants 
were presented with a low anchor and t(197) = 2.15, p = .03, d = .31 when participants were 
presented with a high anchor (see Figure 3). 
 
Figure 3. Average willingness to donate in the four conditions of Experiment 2 
 
 
A second analysis of variance was further performed to test the effect of Anchor and 
Group on participants’ affective reactions. Results showed a significant interaction effect 
between the independent variables, F (1,197) = 6.87; p = .009; η2p = .034. Both main effects 
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
Ingroup Outgroup
9.89
26.31
10.83
17.82
LA
HA
 
 
62 
 
of Anchor and Group were not significant: respectively, F (1,197) = .001; p = .97 for the 
Anchor factor and F (1,197) = .50; p = .48 for the Group factor. Planned contrast effects 
showed that affective reactions were higher for the HA-I than HA-O condition (t(197) = 2.34, 
p = .02, d = .33). Participants who were presented with a high average donation made by the 
ingroup showed higher affective reactions than participants presented with a high average 
donation made by the outgroup (see Table 1). 
 
Table 1. Average responses and standard deviations for the affective reactions, 
familiarity with brain injury diseases, and perception of anchors in Experiment 2 
 Ingroup Outgroup 
 
Low anchor 
(LA-I) 
High anchor 
(HA-I) 
Low anchor 
(LA-O) 
High anchor 
(HA-O) 
 M SD M SD M SD M SD 
Affective reactions 3.83 1.09 4.23 1.15 4.13 .96 3.71 1.20 
Familiarity with brain 
injury diseases 
1.94 1.33 2.18 1.41 2.06 1.53 1.71 1.03 
Importance of others 
donation decision 
3.73 1.81 3.29 1.96 3.94 2.00 2.43 1.84 
Realism of others donation 
decision 
3.92 1.69 2.80 1.40 3.90 1.49 2.87 1.55 
 
Similarly to Experiment 1, I conducted an analysis of variance to explore if there were 
differences in familiarity with brain-injury diseases across conditions. Neither the Anchor nor 
the Group factors showed a significant effect: respectively, F (1,197) = .08; p = .78 for the 
Anchor and F (1,197) = .86; p = .35 for the Group. The interaction was not significant as 
well; F (1,197) = 2.43; p = .12 (see Table 1). 
Finally, an analysis of variance tested if the perceived importance of others’ donations 
was influenced by the Anchor and Group variables. The results showed only a significant 
effect of the Anchor variable (F(1,195) = 13.00; p < .001; η2p = .06), revealing that 
participants in the HA condition considered others’ donation decisions less important 
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compared to the LA. Also, it was completed an additional analysis of variance to assess how 
realistic participants considered others’ donations and found the same result as in Experiment 
1 (MLA = 3.81; SDLA = 1.69 and MHA = 2.40; SDHA = 1.37): others’ donations were 
considered more realistic in the LA condition compared to the HA condition (F(1,194) = 
23.93; p < .001; η2p = .11; see Table 1). There was no significant effect either for the main 
effect of Group or for the interaction between Anchor and Group. 
6.3 Discussion  
In Experiment 2 it was found that, in the LA condition, participants willingness to 
donate was similar regardless from the average donation being referred to the members of an 
ingroup or an outgroup. However, in the HA condition, the same difference was significant: 
participants were more likely to make a donation (“Yes” responses) and also reported higher 
donation amounts when the average donation referred to ingroup members rather than 
outgroup members. Even though participants found the high anchor overall less important 
and less realistic than the low anchor, the social pressure to conform to others behavior was 
higher in the ingroup than in the outgroup condition. Consistent, participants reported higher 
affective reactions in the HA-I condition than in the HA-O condition.  
It is interesting to notice here that the difference between ingroup and outgroup for the 
HA conditions emerged already in the categorical responses; participants accepted less often 
to make a donation when the reference group was the outgroup rather than the ingroup. 
According to previous research (Dickert et al., 2011) this first step of donation decision 
(donate or not) is be driven by more egoistic motivations (feeling good about oneself). In a 
situation like the one tested here participants had the chance to feel better about themselves if 
they accepted to donate even if it was a really small donation (like 1 cent for example). The 
fact that they refused to make a donation when the outgroup is a reference group might 
indicate that something else became more salient in the moment of decision, and reduced 
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participants need to consider their feelings when deciding whether to make a donation or not. 
It is possible that high costs and the impossibility to match the average donation made by the 
outgroup induced some sort of negative feelings. When the average donation made by the 
ingroup is high some people may interpret it in a positive fashion, for instance, inferring that 
the cause must be worth being supported. Since the donation is made by the ingroup it is 
likely to be met with a positive attitude and also to create some sort of social norm that 
motivates the behavior of the members of the group. On the contrary, when the high average 
donation is made by the outgroup, people do not bother to find a positive justification, 
because they feel authorized to have a different opinion compared to the outgroup members 
(Brown, 1984; Brown & Abrams, 1986; Festinger et al., 1950).  
For what concern the affective reactions experienced by the participants, these results 
cannot be compared with the findings from Experiment 1 because in Experiment 2 I did not 
test a condition without the anchor. Therefore it is impossible to say whether the presence of 
the anchor (either high or low) reduced participants affective reactions or not compared to a 
condition in which the anchor is not present. Still, it was replicated the result showing that 
regardless from the anchor (high or low) affective reactions are not significantly different.  
A possible problem with Experiment 2 is that it was used an African needy child as the 
target of the charity scenario to avoid her to belong to either the ingroup or the outgroup. It is 
possible that, in Experiment 2, the results were influenced by the fact that, compared to the 
participants, the target of the charity scenario was part of an outgroup. Because of this 
confounding, I decided to replicate the second experiment asking participants to help an 
Italian child, like in the Experiment 1. 
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7. EXPERIMENT 3 
Experiment 3 manipulated the same variables and has the same hypotheses as 
Experiment 2, however, this time the target of the charity action was a member of the 
ingroup. Participants were all Italians. Half of them were presented with an Italian reference 
group, whereas the other half were presented with a German reference group. Furthermore, 
given the different financial situation between Italy and Germany. I decided to measure 
participant’s perception of the wealth of the reference group. All the other dependent 
variables were the same as in Experiment 2.  
7.1 Method 
7.1.1 Participants and design 
A hundred forty-seven students from the University of Padova (mean age M = 23.5, SD 
= 4.65; 111 females) completed a paper questionnaire during class hours. They were 
randomly assigned to one of the four experimental conditions: 36 in the Low Anchor-Ingroup 
condition (LA-I), 38 in the High Anchor-Ingroup condition (HA-I), 35 in the Low Anchor-
Outgroup condition (LA-O), and 38 in the High Anchor-Outgroup  condition (HA-O). 
7.1.2 Materials and procedure 
Materials used in Experiment 3 were same as in the previous experiment except for the 
fact that the needy child this time was Italian. In addition, participants were asked to rate how 
rich they perceived the reference group in a scale from 1 (not at all) to 7 (very much). Mood 
and happiness showed a significant correlation (r = .56, p < .001) so they were averaged 
together (Mood) and affective reactions showed a good reliability (Cronbach’s alpha equal to 
.79) 
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7.2 Results 
Mood was significantly correlated with the donation amount (r = .19, p = .02) therefore 
it was added as a covariate in the following analyses.  
A loglinear analysis of the Yes/No responses (whether participants wanted to donate or 
not) by Anchor and Group variables showed that only the model of the main results was 
significant (χ2 (7) = 131.21, p > .001). Most participants said that they were willing to donate 
to the charity cause (z = -8.08, p > .001). Two-way and three-way interactions models were 
not significant, respectively χ2 (4) = .31, p = .99 for the two-way interactions and χ2 (1) = .00, 
p = .98 for the three-way interaction.  
An analysis of variance with Anchor and Group as independent factors, Mood as a 
covariate, and donation amount as a dependent variable showed a main effect of Anchor 
(F(1,144) = 37.53, p < .001, η2p = .21) and a significant effect of Group (F(1,144) = 5.16, p < 
.03, η2p = .04) indicating that participants donated more in the HA and in the ingroup 
condition. Furthermore, there was a significant interaction between Anchor and Group 
considering a one-tail hypothesis (F(1,144) = 3.45, p = .032, η2p = .024). Regardless of the 
reference group they were presented with, participants were willing to donate about the same 
amount of money in the LA conditions (M = 9.61 and SD = 5.11 for the ingroup, M = 8.19 
and SD = 6.29 for the outgroup), whereas they were more willing to donate in the ingroup (M 
= 28.95 and SD = 23.75) than the outgroup (M = 17.47 and SD = 12.56) condition when 
presented with a HA (see Figure 4). Once again, like in previous experiments, participants 
who did not want to make a donation were included in the analysis and their donation amount 
was set to zero. 
Planned contrasts showed that all contrasts were significant except LA-I vs. LA-O 
(t(144) = -.42, p=  .67 ). For LA-I vs. HA-I t(144) = -5.86, p < .001, d = .98; for HA-O vs. 
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LA-O , t(144) = 2.72, p =  .01, d = .45; and for HA-O vs. HA-I t(144) = -3.61, p <  .001, d = 
.60. 
 
Figure 4. Average willingness to donate in the four conditions of Experiment 3 
 
 
An analysis of variance with Anchor and Group as independent factors, Mood as a 
covariate, and affective reactions as the dependent variable showed only a main effect of the 
Group variable (F(1,144) = 4.99, p < .023, η2p = .01) indicating that affective reactions were 
higher for the ingroup conditions (M = 4.43 and SD = 1.02) compared to the outgroup 
conditions (M = 4.06 and SD = 1.16). As in Experiment 2, the Familiarity variable was not 
significantly different through the experimental conditions. Furthermore, participants found 
other’s behavior more important in the LA condition compared to the HA condition (F(1,143) 
= 3.88, p = .05, η2p = .03) and they found other’s behavior more realistic in the LA condition 
compared to the HA condition (F(1,143) = 6.63, p = .01, η2p = .05; see Table 2). 
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Table 2. Average responses and standard deviations for the affective reactions, 
familiarity with brain injury diseases, perception of anchors and wealth of the reference 
group in Experiment 3 
 Ingroup Outgroup 
 
Low anchor 
(LA-I) 
High anchor 
(HA-I) 
Low anchor 
(LA-O) 
High anchor 
(HA-O) 
 M SD M SD M SD M SD 
Affective reactions 4.38 1.10 4.46 .94 4.21 1.15 3.99 1.19 
Familiarity with brain 
injury diseases 
3.00 1.91 2.26 1.25 2.41 1.60 2.76 1.82 
Importance of others 
donation decision 
3.46 2.08 2.97 1,70 3.46 1.99 2.63 1.76 
Realism of others donation 
decision 
4.14 1.38 3.34 1.60 4.00 1.48 3.50 1.48 
Perceived wealth of the 
reference group 
1.82 1.14 2.87 1.73 2.79 2.06 4.16 1.85 
 
Finally, results confirmed that German citizens were perceived as significantly richer 
than Italians (t(141) = -3.77, p < .01), but adding this variable as a covariate did not influence 
either the donation decision (F(1,140) = .81, p = .37) or the affective reactions (F(1,140) = 
2.22, p = .14; see Table 2).  
7.3 Discussion  
Experiment 3 showed that most of the participants were willing to make a donation, 
independently from the experimental condition, however, similar to Experiment 2, there was 
a difference in the amount of money participants were willing to donate depending on the 
Group and Anchor variables. Specifically, they decided to donate about the same amount 
between the ingroup and outgroup in the LA conditions, but they anchored more to others’ 
opinions (and donated a higher amount of money) in the HA conditions when the reference 
group was the ingroup, then when it was the outgroup.  
According to the literature on charity giving research (Dickert et al., 2011; Evangelidis 
& Van den Bergh, 2013) categorical responses seem to be governed by different mechanism 
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than continuous responses; initially, self-focused motivations (like mood management) guide 
peoples’ decisions regarding whether to make a donate or not, and at a subsequent stage, 
other focused motivations (like empathic feelings) influence the decision regarding how 
much a person wants to help (e.g., which donation amount he/she decides to give). The 
difference between the present experiment (where most of the participants accepted to make a 
donation, and experimental conditions made a difference only on willingness to donate) and 
Experiment 2 (where condition also influenced the categorical variable measuring whether 
participants were willing to help or not) might be explained by the different target of the fund 
raising campaign. It is possible that the ingroup victim activated stronger feelings of guilt, 
which makes more difficult for people to refuse helping (Brewer & Gardner, 1996; Dovidio 
et al., 1997; Kogut & Ritov, 2007; 2011).  
Moreover, affective reactions in Experiment 3 did not show a difference depending on 
the anchoring condition (low vs. high anchor), replicating the results found in the previous 
two experiments. Additionally, this time, there was a main effect of the group variable 
revealing that, overall, affective reactions were higher when the reference group was the 
ingroup rather than outgroup and this difference is in the same direction as the donation 
amounts. Results for affective reactions are also slightly different in Experiment 3 compared 
to Experiment 2, where affective reactions were higher for the ingroup than outgroup, but 
only in the HA conditions. As the literature suggests, a victim’s group belongingness might 
have an important impact on donation decisions (Kogut & Ritov, 2007), so an ingroup victim 
(Experiment 3) might activate more intense affective reactions toward the social cause than 
an outgroup victim (Experiment 2). However, similar to the group belongingness of other 
people who made a donation, also the group the victim belong to, or other contextual 
information related to the charity might result important only when the donation decision is 
difficult (for example request for high donation amounts, like in the HA conditions). 
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Rubaltelli and Agnoli (2012) have shown that in a situation where people are living a conflict 
between high costs and the desire to help others even a decoy (a dominated option) might 
result important to resolve the conflict, because this additional information makes the choice 
easier. On the other hand, when the donation amount is easier to match, people might not 
need to consider further information related to the charity context, because there is a reduced 
need to give meaning to the fund raising campaign.  
Like in the previous experiments, participants reported that they found less realistic and 
less important the others’ opinion in the HA condition than in the LA condition, but, on 
average, they kept donating more in these conditions. Finally, in Experiment 3, I found that 
participants perceived Germans richer than Italians. However, this variable did not influence 
results concerning donation amounts and affective reactions. The actual financial situation of 
Italy and Germany could have been a confounding  to the present results. Strack and 
Mussweiler (1997) showed that the direction in which the anchors influence the judgments 
depends on whether target and context stimuli are similar. When the target and stimuli are 
identical, participants’ judgments are assimilated toward the anchors. However, in this 
context, results reject convincingly this alternative explanation of the effect of others’ 
opinions on donation decisions.   
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8. GENERAL DISCUSSION 
The findings of the three experiments described in the present dissertation are 
consistent with the literature on the anchoring effect (Epley & Gilovich, 2006; Tversky & 
Kahneman, 1974): when people are given a high anchor, they are willing to donate more 
compared to a condition in which they are given a low anchor or no anchor. Furthermore, I 
found that the low anchor did not make a significant difference compared to a condition in 
which no anchor was presented. In Experiment 1, participants donated, on average, €22.13 in 
the LA condition and €19.46 in the NA condition. Although this difference was not 
significant, participants experienced lower affective reactions in the LA condition (and in the 
HA condition) compared to the NA condition. I argue that this could be related to limitations 
in the attentional resources (Broadbent & Broadbent, 1987; Conway, 1996; Raymond et al., 
1992). Information about others’ donations might become more relevant when deciding the 
worth of contributing to a social cause; therefore, while focusing on others’ behavior, 
participants pay less attention to the target of their helping action and subsequently feel 
emotionally less involved. Additionally, the anchor can be used as feedback on the correct 
donation amount, therefore reducing the need to attend to one’s affective reactions, which are 
often used as information on how much to donate (Kogut & Ritov, 2005a, b; Dickert et al., 
2011).   
Although it is difficult to tell if participants were influenced by the anchor in the LA 
condition or simply respected their baseline donations, it can be concluded that, in the HA 
condition, they made a significantly larger donation compared to the NA condition; therefore, 
we can consider this manipulation effective at increasing willingness to donate. In addition, 
donations in the HA condition were much lower than the anchorpoint compared to the LA 
condition. In Experiment 1, the average donation amount was €58 less than the high anchor 
(€90), in Experiment 2, it was about €48 less than the high anchor (€70) and, in Experiment 
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3, participants donated on average about €46 less than the high anchor (€70). At the same 
time, in all three experiments, donations in the LA condition exceeded what other people had 
reportedly donated, probably because it was quite a low amount of money (€10). From 
Experiment 1 we also know that donations in the LA condition were not significantly 
different from donations in the NA condition, therefore this could have made easier for the 
participants to give a sum larger than the low anchor. Consistent with these results, and 
despite the effect found for the willingness to donate, participants indicated that the anchor 
was less realistic in the HA condition compared to the LA condition, and, in Experiment 2 
and 3, participants reported that they perceived the importance of others’ donations lower in 
the HA condition than the LA condition. Despite being considered less realistic the high 
anchor had an effect on how much participants were willing to donate and this result is 
consistent with previous research showing that even extremely implausible anchor values 
produce a strong assimilation effect (Strack & Mussweiler, 1997). 
Additionally, in Experiment 2 and 3, consistent with the hypotheses, it was found that 
participants in the HA-O condition donated less money than participants in the HA-I 
condition. As described in the hypothesis section, when the reference donation is low (€10) it 
is closer to the no-anchor average donation and it is easier to match independently from the 
reference group, but when the reference donation is high (€70) and the decision is 
presumably more difficult, participants’ donations are higher in the ingroup condition. The 
anchors used in my experiments were not irrelevant numbers, but were presented as average 
donations made by other people, which means that they should be considered in light of 
social-comparison motivations. If we consider the anchor as information that generated social 
pressure, it is reasonable to find that people conformed more easily to the behavior of 
members of their group than to the behavior of members of an outgroup (Deutsch & Gerard, 
1955; Lewis, Langan, & Hollander, 1972). Beside this, participants reported less intense 
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affective reactions toward the victim in the HA-O condition than in the HA-I condition 
(Experiment 2) and lower affective reaction overall for the outgroup than ingroup 
(Experiment 3). Since in Experiment 2 and 3 anchors were presented in all conditions and 
each participant saw exactly the same amount of information, we cannot consider the limited 
attentional resources as an explanation to these results. In this case, I hypothesized that the 
difference in the affective reactions experienced when presented with an ingroup versus an 
outgroup should depend on a justification that participants apply to their donation decision 
when the group variable is added. Cameron and Payne (2011) found that, when people 
consider the request to be in an amount which is too large for them to help, they regulate their 
emotions in order to avoid a cognitive-emotional conflict.  
The fact that in the HA conditions participants considered other people’s opinions only 
when the reference group was the ingroup might indicate that an external information (like 
the reference group) facilitates the decision in a situation where others’ donations are difficult 
to match. Rubaltelli and Agnoli (2012) found that people live a conflict between moral 
intuitions (e.g., fulfilling moral obligations and helping as many individuals in need as 
possible) and the cost entailed by following one's moral intuitions (e.g., spending money). 
When the authors introduced a decoy (a third dominated alternative) the conflict was reduced, 
and participants chose the option which helped more victims and asked for a higher donation. 
It is possible that knowing the average donation given by other people belonging to either an 
ingroup or outgroup had a similar effect in the present studies. If this is true, other variables 
similar to group belongingness or decoy can be used to increase willingness to help because 
they offer to the donor a reason to accept a higher cost (that is, provide a motivation to give 
up a bigger chunk of his/her resources). 
Looking to previous models that investigated how others’ behavior influences a donor’s 
contribution, it is possible to conclude that this findings are more supportive of complement 
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models than substantive models (Bernheim, 1994; Croson, 2007; Shang & Croson, 2009; 
Sugden, 1984; Vesterlund, 2003). Consistent with complement models, participants showed a 
tendency to conform to the behavior of others and to use this information as a reference point 
to decide how much money should be donated, rather than simply reducing their 
contributions. In the HA condition, participants donated much less than the anchor, but still 
more than in the LA and NA conditions. I believe this is a reasonable result, especially in a 
situation in which people are asked to answer an open-ended question about how much they 
are willing to donate. It is likely that people find it difficult to establish how much it is worth 
to contribute to a specific social cause. Therefore, they need a reference point or any other 
information that can help them make sense of the situation. In most cases, the lack of more 
reliable information leads people to use their own affective reactions as an indicator of how 
much they should donate (Batson et al., 1991; Kogut & Ritov, 2005a, b; Dickert et al., 2011). 
By knowing how much others donate, potential donors have a more reliable piece of 
information at their disposal and can simply conform to it. 
Furthermore, an alternative explanation to the results of the present studies might be the 
compatibility effect (Tversky, Sattath, & Slovic, 1988; Slovic, Griffin, & Tversky, 1990; 
Willemsen, Böckenholt, & Johnson, 2011). According to this effect, when the response scale 
is compatible to certain attributes presented previously in the attentional span, they are 
assigned greater weight because they are more easily mapped onto the response. This means 
that having an information about others’ donations in euros and asking participants to report 
their willingness to donate in euros should make the information about the average amount 
given by other people particularly salient and useful.  
Finally, this results show that people’s choice in a similar situation is not explained by 
altruism (pure or impure). According to substitute models individuals derive utility both from 
their own private consumption (the amount of help someone gives) and the consumption of 
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others (the amount of help someone receives; Becker, 1974). Pure altruism should bring a 
complete crowding out; as the level of public good provided by others increases, the marginal 
value from additional contribution toward the public good should decrease proportionally 
(Roberts, 1984; Warr, 1982). This because if we are exclusively interested in the victim’s 
wellbeing (Batson et al, 1991) and someone else offered help previously to him/her, there is 
no need for us to give help. Instead, impure altruism explains a partial crowding out 
(Andreoni, 1990); if others are giving their contribution for a certain charity cause the value 
from an individual gift is much lower. In this case the individual will not have the exclusivity 
of being the only donor, which means less prestige, social reward, and less warm-glow. 
Complement models explain that people do to not consider the victim’s situation since they 
do not lower their contributions when others are already helping, but they relate positively 
their giving with the others’ giving because of reciprocity (Sugden, 1984) conformity 
(Bernheim, 1994), or just making the appropriate or necessary contribution in order to 
achieve social approval (Vesterlund, 2006).  
8.1 Implications 
When people are considering to donate money for a charity cause they are obviously 
interested to know how would other people behave in the same situation. Knowing others’ 
donations is an indirect way to understand what are the others’ opinions regarding that cause 
(above the victim’s need, the charity organization and so on). Does learning that others’ are 
donating a high (versus a low) amount of money increase someone’s donation? The present 
studies suggest that it does, even when other people’s donation is not perceived as too 
realistic (HA condition). Most importantly, high anchors increase donations comparing to a 
situation where no anchors are given, so using anchors in general can have a positive effect 
on the overall amount of money collected by a fund raising effort.  
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However, there are side effects that come with the use of anchors, which might be a 
risk when a charity organization is interested in long-term donations rather than one-shot 
contributions. Anchors presented as social information in general might shift attentional 
resources from the charity cause to the social appropriateness of the donation decision, which 
means lower affective reactions toward the victim. As a consequence, this might include 
negative responses in future requests for donations. Several reasons can lead to a similar 
thing. First, the use of social influence can weaken the emotional connection between donors 
and victims, therefore reducing people’s motivation to help the same charitable cause in 
subsequent occasions. Second, people may find it difficult to cope with repeated situations in 
which they feel (directly or indirectly) forced to give more than they would be willing to, 
only because the donation has become a way to express group belonging and to avoid feeling 
embarrassed.  
On the other side, the present studies show that it is also possible to find alternative 
methods that can reduce cost perception or make people accept more easily high donation 
costs, like group belongingness in this case. Several studies have shown that the actual cost 
and the perceived cost can be different concepts, and reducing cost can help increasing 
donations (Havens, O’Herlihy & Schervish, 2006; Rubaltelli & Agnoli, 2012; Wiepking & 
Breeze, 2011). This can be particularly important for the charity giving decisions because 
economic costs can be a main inhibitor to the prosocial behavior. If costs are perceived as a 
loss, and benefits for oneself (warm-glow feelings, prestige, social recognition and so on) or 
the person in need are considered as a gain, according to prospect theory (Kahneman & 
Tversky, 1979) losses have a bigger weight than gains, and people are less disposed to help in 
this case. For this reason, lowering the perception of costs or increasing the perception of 
benefits might result highly important in the charity giving context.   
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8.2 Limitations 
A limit of the present studies might be related to the fact, despite using a few strategies 
to make participants feel their donations as realistic as possible, in the end thy had to report a 
hypothetical value. As I explained in the methodology section of the previous experiments, a 
prize draw methodology was used; one participant was chosen randomly and he/she won 100 
euros minus the donation amount he/she decided to give for the charity cause. This probably 
induced participants to give responses closer to real-life situation, but again, this could have 
been perceived as “earning less money” rather than “loosing less money”, because the €100 
was not money from their pocket, but money they would have earned from an experimental 
situation.  
Another limitation might be that in the present studies it was used only a charity 
scenario, which describes a girl from Italy (or Africa) that was affected by a brain damage 
and in need of financial help. Familiarity of participants with the present illness was 
measured and it did not influence the results. However, it would be interesting to generalize 
the same effects to other charitable causes like different diseases, non-health care related 
issues (poverty, human rights, education and so on), and programs helping animals or 
fighting for environmental sustainability.  
8.3 Future research 
Future studies should try to understand why people did not conform more to the high 
anchors and should investigate whether in the HA condition participants experienced a 
conflict between how much they are willing to donate and how much others are reported to 
have contributed. If the conflict is present, as I believe to be the case, it would be important to 
investigate how people regulate this conflict. It is possible that individuals downplay the 
importance of their contribution when they are unable to match others’ donations. Although 
in the present studies it was measured how important the anchor was for participants, I did 
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not measure participants’ evaluation of  the importance of their own donation. Several studies 
have shown that people donate more often when they think that their contributions are useful 
and would make a difference for the charity situation (Fetherstonhaugh et al., 1997; 
Markowitz, Slovic, Västfjäll, & Hodges, 2013). Fetherstonhaugh and colleagues (1997) have 
found that  participants were more willing to help 9.000 out of 15.000 lives under risk rather 
than saving 100.000 out of 290.000 lives under risk. 
Future research should also focus on manipulating anchors and group belonging in a 
real fundraising context as well as testing whether anchors unrelated to other people’s 
behavior can influence donors’ responses, or whether responses are further changed when 
different types of contributions are requested (for instance: money, time and effort). 
Conclusion 
The present experiments allowed to understand how people react when they are 
informed how much other people donate to a specific cause, particularly when anchors refer 
to the behavior of members of an ingroup or outgroup. The results showed that, when people 
are presented with high anchors, they are more likely to conform to the anchor and increase 
rather than reduce their donations. This behavior is particularly evident when the high anchor 
refers to the behavior of ingroup members. 
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APPENDIX A 
MATERIALS FOR EXPERIMENT 1 
Please read the following scenario and answer the questions that you find in the next pages : 
Imagine that you are asked to donate money for a humanitarian organization that you trust and that 
has put in place a series of projects to help brain-injured children. This disease includes brain 
damages, the causes of which are not identifiable, and it has various implications such as mental 
retardation, muscular dystrophy, emotional disturbances. In particular , these children may suffer 
from severe respiratory complications. 
After careful studies, in order to improve the central control of respiration , it has been devised a 
breathing machine. Thanks to this machine you avoid the brain- injured child to contract lung 
infections escaping this way the frequent hospital admissions and which means also a big savings for 
the community. 
In particular, your donation will be used for a project in support of Elena , a girl of 6 years old and 
lives with her parents in Verona . 
 
 
On average, Italian citizens are willing to donate €10 in favor of this project
1
 
 
 
Are you willing to make a donation towards the purchase of the breathing machine for Elena?       
 
 
Yes [__]         No [__] 
 
Taking into account your monthly budget, how much are you willing to donate to help Elena? 
_____________ € 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
1
 The present sentence was presented to participants in the LA condition. In the HA condition it was written 
€90 instead of €10, and in the NA condition nothing was written below the image of Elena.  
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Please respond to the following questions in  a scale from 1 (Not at all) to 7 (Very much).  
 
 
1. How much do you feel worried thinking about Elena? (1 2 3 4 5 6 7 ) 
 
2. How much do you feel sad thinking about Elena? (1 2 3 4 5 6 7 ) 
 
 
3. How much sympathy and compassion did you feel thinking about Elena? (1 2 3 4 5 6 7 ) 
 
 
4. Donating money to help Elena makes me feel better. (1 2 3 4 5 6 7 ) 
 
 
5. Reading the story about Elena, provokes negative feelings in me. (1 2 3 4 5 6 7 ) 
 
 
6. If I decided not to donate I would feel guilty. (1 2 3 4 5 6 7 ) 
 
 
7. How familiar are you with the brain injures illness? (1 2 3 4 5 6 7 ) 
 
 
8. How important did you find the other Italians average donation for your decision about the 
donation amount? (1 2 3 4 5 6 7 ) 
 
 
9. How realistic did you find the average donation of other Italians? (1 2 3 4 5 6 7 )
2
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
2
 Question 8 and 9 where presented only when participants belonged to the LA or HA conditions.  
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APPENDIX B 
 
MATERIALS FOR EXPERIMENT 2 
Please read the following scenario and answer the questions that you find in the next pages : 
Imagine that you are asked to donate money for a humanitarian organization that you trust and that 
has put in place a series of projects to help brain-injured children. This disease includes brain 
damages, the causes of which are not identifiable, and it has various implications such as mental 
retardation, muscular dystrophy, emotional disturbances. In particular , these children may suffer 
from severe respiratory complications. 
After careful studies, in order to improve the central control of respiration , it has been devised a 
breathing machine. Thanks to this machine you avoid the brain- injured child to contract lung 
infections escaping this way the frequent hospital admissions and which means also a big savings for 
the community. 
In particular, your donation will be used for a project in support of Elena , a girl of 6 years old and 
lives with her parents in Verona . 
 
On average, Italian citizens are willing to donate €10 in favor of this project
3 
Are you willing to make a donation towards the purchase of the breathing machine for Elena?       
 
 
Yes [__]         No [__] 
 
Taking into account your monthly budget, how much are you willing to donate to help Elena? 
_____________ € 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
3
 The present sentence was presented to participants in the LA-I condition. In the HA-I condition it was 
written “On average, Italian citizens are willing to donate €70 euro in favor of this project”, in the LA-O 
condition it was written ““On average, German citizens are willing to donate €10 euro in favor of this 
project”, and in the HA-O condition it was written ““On average, German citizens are willing to donate 
€70 euro in favor of this project”.  
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Please respond to the following questions in  a scale from 1 (Not at all) to 7 (Very much).  
 
 
1. How much do you feel worried thinking about Elena? (1 2 3 4 5 6 7 ) 
 
2. How much do you feel sad thinking about Elena? (1 2 3 4 5 6 7 ) 
 
 
3. How much sympathy and compassion did you feel thinking about Elena? (1 2 3 4 5 6 7 ) 
 
 
4. Donating money to help Elena makes me feel better. (1 2 3 4 5 6 7 ) 
 
 
5. Reading the story about Elena, provokes negative feelings in me. (1 2 3 4 5 6 7 ) 
 
 
6. If I decided not to donate I would feel guilty. (1 2 3 4 5 6 7 ) 
 
 
7. How familiar are you with the brain injures illness? (1 2 3 4 5 6 7 ) 
 
 
8. How important did you find the other Italians average donation for your decision about the 
donation amount? (1 2 3 4 5 6 7 ) 
 
 
9. How realistic did you find the average donation of other Italians? (1 2 3 4 5 6 7 ) 
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APPENDIX C 
 
MATERIALS FOR EXPERIMENT 3 
Please read the following scenario and answer the questions that you find in the next pages : 
Imagine that you are asked to donate money for a humanitarian organization that you trust and that 
has put in place a series of projects to help brain-injured children. This disease includes brain 
damages, the causes of which are not identifiable, and it has various implications such as mental 
retardation, muscular dystrophy, emotional disturbances. In particular , these children may suffer 
from severe respiratory complications. 
After careful studies, in order to improve the central control of respiration , it has been devised a 
breathing machine. Thanks to this machine you avoid the brain- injured child to contract lung 
infections escaping this way the frequent hospital admissions and which means also a big savings for 
the community. 
In particular, your donation will be used for a project in support of Elena , a girl of 6 years old and 
lives with her parents in Verona . 
 
On average, Italian citizens are willing to donate €10 in favor of this project
4
 
 
 
Are you willing to make a donation towards the purchase of the breathing machine for Elena?       
 
 
Yes [__]         No [__] 
 
Taking into account your monthly budget, how much are you willing to donate to help Elena? 
_____________ € 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
4
 The present sentence was presented to participants in the LA-I condition. In the HA-I condition it was 
written “On average, Italian citizens are willing to donate €70 euro in favor of this project”, in the LA-O 
condition it was written ““On average, German citizens are willing to donate €10 euro in favor of this 
project”, and in the HA-O condition it was written ““On average, German citizens are willing to donate 
€70 euro in favor of this project”.  
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Please respond to the following questions in  a scale from 1 (Not at all) to 7 (Very much).  
 
 
1. How much do you feel worried thinking about Elena? (1 2 3 4 5 6 7 ) 
 
2. How much do you feel sad thinking about Elena? (1 2 3 4 5 6 7 ) 
 
 
3. How much sympathy and compassion did you feel thinking about Elena? (1 2 3 4 5 6 7 ) 
 
 
4. Donating money to help Elena makes me feel better. (1 2 3 4 5 6 7 ) 
 
 
5. Reading the story about Elena, provokes negative feelings in me. (1 2 3 4 5 6 7 ) 
 
 
6. If I decided not to donate I would feel guilty. (1 2 3 4 5 6 7 ) 
 
 
7. How familiar are you with the brain injures illness? (1 2 3 4 5 6 7 ) 
 
 
8. How important did you find the other Italians average donation for your decision about the 
donation amount? (1 2 3 4 5 6 7 ) 
 
 
9. How realistic did you find the average donation of other Italians? (1 2 3 4 5 6 7 ) 
 
 
 
 
